SUPREME FEDERAL COURT AND FEDERALISM: ABSTRACT / CONCENTRATE CONTROL OF CONSTITUTIONALITY AS A MECHANISM TO LIMIT DECENTRALIZATION

Abstract

In federations, the existence of at least two levels of government with constitutionally, with defined roles in a non-hierarchical (at least formally) relationship, raises the question of who will be the referee when component units conflict. Federative systems therefore demand instruments for the composition of federative disputes. In most federations the judiciary, through the Supreme Court, plays an important role in resolving these conflicts. In Brazil, the role of arbitrator is played by the Federal Supreme Court (STF) and the main mechanism through which federal disputes are triggered is the Direct Unconstitutionality Action (ADI), an instrument through which a state can seek invalidation of a Union legislative decision and vice versa. In this context, the question that emerges is, in a scenario marked by the concentration of legislative powers in the central government as defined by the 1988 Constitution, what would be the role of the Supreme Court, as the main and last arena of clashes between federated entities. The results of these processes demonstrate the Supreme Court favored the expansion of central legislative jurisdiction.