Human dignity and negativity: a study on Jay Bernstein’s theory of human rights

Abstract

Contemporary human rights theory is shaped by the debate between orthodox and political approaches. Orthodox, or moral, theories endorse two central theses: the thesis of nature, according to which human rights are moral rights held by every human being solely by virtue of their humanity; and the thesis of grounding, which maintains that the existence and content of human rights can be identified through natural moral reasoning, even if supplemented by other forms of reasoning. Political theories reject these theses, in whole or in part. In contrast to both strands, Jay Bernstein proposes an account of human dignity rooted in the experience of the victim, understood as a negative moment capable of revealing constitutive aspects of human existence and, thereby, generating normative content for dignity. The aim of this article is to philosophically analyze the concept of human dignity in relation to social negativity, defined as experiences of suffering, humiliation, and violation. The method consists of a critical examination of the two predominant currents in human rights theory, articulated with Bernstein’s theoretical insights. The results indicate that dignity may be conceived not only as the foundation of institutional human rights practice, but also as a category capable of integrating experiences of social negativity into its definition. The study concludes that this conception expands the critical scope of dignity, enabling the denunciation of injustices and forms of suffering that constitute the negation of an essential intrinsic value.