Impeachment, additional credits and budgetary decision-making: A new dilemma for the law and for the politics?
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5380/rfdufpr.v62i3.56181Keywords:
Public Finance Law. Additional credits. Impeachment. Accountability. Public budget.Abstract
There are not a lot of studies about presidential appropriation in Brazil – the almost equivalent of supplemental appropriation in USA – both in Law and in Political Science. The presidential appropriation is an ordinary instrument in the government’s activity, and it is powerful enough to allow the Executive Branch to spend the money without the participation of the Legislative, at least at the first moment. This article analyses the presidential appropriation of the three previous presidents of Brazil and aims at searching how the tool has been applied by them. To verify the variation and if there was abuse in the adoption of these instruments by the federal government, we organized and analysed a database with information about additional appropriation – a category of legislative acts that modify the budget, including presidential appropriation – between 2011 and 2016. The central question studied is: Will the government, the parliament, the Union Audit Court and other institutions accept a new reality in public finance? Partial conclusions, with no intention make false previsions, indicate that the federal budget will ever accept changes by additional credits – additional appropriations –, but with the obedience of the rule of law, the democracy and the previsibility of the public budget. However, it is not possible to confirm that the additional appropriations, after the impeachment of former President Dilma Roussef, will be subject of more studies inside the budget process. If not be subject of more studies, the country would restablish the permissiveness between the branches and institutions.
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