TORT LAW, JUSTICE AND INSTITUTIONAL REGIME: A COMPARISON BETWEEN THE WELFARE STATE AND ECONOMIC DEMOCRACY

Authors

  • Leandro Martins Zanitelli Centro Universitário Ritter dos Reis (UniRitter)

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.5380/rfdufpr.v60i2.38089

Keywords:

Economic democracy. Externalities. Justice. Tort law. Welfare state.

Abstract

The paper distinguishes two types of institutional regime, welfare state and economic democracy, and attempts to determine which tort rules are most suited to each one of them. It argues in favor of two central claims, namely, that a tendency for the adoption of strict liability rules in Brazilian law coheres with welfare state’s capitalist way of production, and that strict liability rules are also required by economic democracy, a kind of institutional regime in which the problem of externalities, though probably minored, still exists. In so doing, the paper also illustrates a (“indirect”) way of examining issues of private law through the lens of justice, which consists in first electing the type of institutional regime most prone to the realization of the principles of justice and inquiring thereafter about which rules of private law are fitted for that regime.

Author Biography

Leandro Martins Zanitelli, Centro Universitário Ritter dos Reis (UniRitter)

Doutor em Direito pela Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS); Professor e Coordenador do Programa de Pós-Graduação Stricto Sensu – Mestrado Acadêmico em Direito do Centro Universitário Ritter dos Reis (UniRitter).

Published

2015-02-25

How to Cite

Zanitelli, L. M. (2015). TORT LAW, JUSTICE AND INSTITUTIONAL REGIME: A COMPARISON BETWEEN THE WELFARE STATE AND ECONOMIC DEMOCRACY. Revista Da Faculdade De Direito UFPR, 60(2), 141–155. https://doi.org/10.5380/rfdufpr.v60i2.38089

Issue

Section

Artigos