THE CONTRIBUTION AND THE LIMITS OF KLAUS GUNTHER’S THEORY: THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN JUSTIFICATION AND APPLICATION DISCOURSES FOR A RECONSTRUCTION OF JUDICIAL FUNCTION

Authors

  • Flávio Quinaud Pedron

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.5380/rfdufpr.v48i0.15748

Keywords:

Aplicação e conflito entre princípio, legitimidade das decisões judiciais, jurisprudência de valores, Aplication and principle´s conflict, legal decisions legitimacy, value jurisprudence

Abstract

The following article intendsto rebuilt the argumentative base of KlausGünther’s Legal Reasonable in order todemonstrate how the separation betweenjustification and application legal discoursesrepresents a more appropriate answer tocases involving “principles collisions”than Robert Alexy’s theory. Furthermore,Günther plays an important role in the(re)construction of a procedural theoryrelated to Jürgen Habermas’ discoursivetheory, demonstrating how it is possibleto achieve legitimacy in the processof adjudication.

How to Cite

Pedron, F. Q. (2008). THE CONTRIBUTION AND THE LIMITS OF KLAUS GUNTHER’S THEORY: THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN JUSTIFICATION AND APPLICATION DISCOURSES FOR A RECONSTRUCTION OF JUDICIAL FUNCTION. Revista Da Faculdade De Direito UFPR, 48. https://doi.org/10.5380/rfdufpr.v48i0.15748

Issue

Section

Artigos