THE CONTRIBUTION AND THE LIMITS OF KLAUS GUNTHER’S THEORY: THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN JUSTIFICATION AND APPLICATION DISCOURSES FOR A RECONSTRUCTION OF JUDICIAL FUNCTION
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5380/rfdufpr.v48i0.15748Keywords:
Aplicação e conflito entre princípio, legitimidade das decisões judiciais, jurisprudência de valores, Aplication and principle´s conflict, legal decisions legitimacy, value jurisprudenceAbstract
The following article intendsto rebuilt the argumentative base of KlausGünther’s Legal Reasonable in order todemonstrate how the separation betweenjustification and application legal discoursesrepresents a more appropriate answer tocases involving “principles collisions”than Robert Alexy’s theory. Furthermore,Günther plays an important role in the(re)construction of a procedural theoryrelated to Jürgen Habermas’ discoursivetheory, demonstrating how it is possibleto achieve legitimacy in the processof adjudication.Downloads
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