he highest good as immanent and transcendent in Kant's philosophy

Abstract

In the secondary literature, the doctrine of the highest good has sparked numerous controversies. Many have pointed out the difficulty of reconciling the doctrine of the highest good with the categorical imperative or even with the overall system of critical-transcendental philosophy. Due to its profound ambiguity, various divergent interpretations have emerged in more recent literature. Among these interpretations, one school of thought argues that the highest good should be understood from an individual, transcendent, and religious perspective, in which the connection between virtue and happiness is conceivable under the joint conditions of the immortality of the soul and the existence of God. This position is especially observed in the writings of the 1780s. Another line of interpretation believes that the doctrine of the highest good only becomes coherent when conceived from a collective and immanent perspective, which assigns a central role to its historical and political dimensions. The writings of the 1790s serve as the basis for this line of interpretation. According to some scholars, the emphasis given in these writings to the concept of the “highest good in the world” marks a shift in perspective on the doctrine of the highest good, wherein the transcendent position of the previous decade is believed to have been abandoned by Kant in favor of an immanent perspective. My goal is to present, in general terms, the status of the question, as well as some arguments in favor of a compatibilist thesis. I argue that, in the 1790s, Kant assumes an immanent perspective on the highest good but does not abandon its transcendent dimension. I maintain that, from a systematic perspective, the immanent perspective is problematic, and therefore, the transcendent perspective must continue to be considered the foundation of the doctrine of the highest good.