Kant and Hegel on logic and ontology

Philosophizing without judgments and syllogisms. A Hegelian response to the logocentric predicament

Authors

  • Miguel Herszenbaun CONICET-UNIPE/UBA

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.5380/sk.v24i1.99968

Keywords:

transcendental logic, formal logic, speculative logic, method

Abstract

In Hegel’s Logic and Metaphysics, McNulty interprets the Science of Logic as an inversion of Kant’s relation between formal logic and ontology, highlighting a fundamental problem: Kant presupposes formal logic to derive transcendental logic. McNulty calls this the logocentric predicament and claims that Hegel proposes a theory of categories that does not presuppose formal logic. After discussing this approach, I offer an alternative thesis. I claim that Hegel’s Logic includes a retroactive-retrospective dimension, meaning subsequent elements are somehow present and operative in earlier stages of this logical development. The Logic does not presuppose formal logic but progressively deduces its methodology through an intellectual experience revealing the movement of object and thought. However, these progressively deduced elements are somehow present and operative in earlier logical stages. McNulty overlooks this, leading to mistaken conclusions about the absence of concepts, judgments, and syllogisms throughout Hegel’s Logic.

Author Biography

Miguel Herszenbaun, CONICET-UNIPE/UBA

Miguel Herszenbaun is a researcher at Conicet, holds a PhD in Philosophy, and is Professor of Philosophy and Lawyer. He teaches at both the Faculty of Law and the Faculty of Philosophy at the Universidad de Buenos Aires. He specializes in the philosophy of Kant and Hegel, as well as in modern philosophy. He is the author of the book La antinomia de la razón pura en Kant y Hegel, and among his recent publications is the article Kant and the Production of the Antinomy of Pure Reason, in Kant-Studien.

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Published

2026-04-30

How to Cite

Herszenbaun, M. (2026). Kant and Hegel on logic and ontology: Philosophizing without judgments and syllogisms. A Hegelian response to the logocentric predicament. Studia Kantiana, 24(1), 23–37. https://doi.org/10.5380/sk.v24i1.99968

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