The role of the function of judgment in intuition and the problem of generality for conceptualist readings of Kant
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5380/sk.v22i3.93766Keywords:
intuição, conceito, percepção, conceitualismo kantiano, não judicativismo.Abstract
This paper intends to critically discuss the exegetical and philosophical implications of adopting a conceptualist position on Kant’s philosophy, with regard, more specifically, to the role of concepts in intuitions. In saying that “The same function which gives unity to the various representations in a judgment also gives unity to the mere synthesis of different representations in an intuition” (KrV, A79/B104-5), Kant, in fact, opens up space for a conceptualist reading. However, I intend to show that a conceptualist interpretation faces both textual and argumentative problems. Taking as a starting point the debate between Kantian conceptualists (McDowell, 2009a; Land, 2015) and non-conceptualists (Hanna, 2006; Allais, 2009; De Sa Pereira, 2013; McLear, 2016), I seek to show that the involvement of concepts in intuitions would result in a philosophical problem that goes beyond the Kantian debate (Travis, 2018; Siegel, 2019): namely, that of how intuition, with its particular nature, could at the same time encompass an aspect of generality typical of concepts.
References
ALLAIS, L. Kant, Non-conceptual content, and the representation of space. Journal of the History of Philosophy, 47 (3), pp. 383-413, 2009.
ALLAIS, L. Conceptualism and nonconceptualism in kant: a survey of the recent debate. In: SCHULTING, D. (ed.). Kantian Non-conceptualism. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016.
CONNOLLY, K. Which Kantian conceptualism (or nonconceptualism)? Southern Journal of Philosophy, 52 (3), 316-337, 2014.
DE SA PEREIRA, R. H. What is Non-conceptualism in Kant’s philosophy? Philosophical Studies, 164: 233-254, 2013.
EVANS, G. The Varieties of reference. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982.
FREGE, G. Der Gedanke. Beitrage zur Philosophie des deutschen Idealismus, vol. 2: pp. 58–77.
GERSEL, J. What is the myth of the given? In: GERSEL, J. et. al. (ed.). In the Light of Experience: Essays on reasons and perception, pp. 23-35. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018.
GINSBORG, H. Was Kant a non-conceptualist? Philosophical Studies, 137, pp. 65-77, 2008.
GOLOB, S. Heidegger on concepts, freedom and normativity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014.
GRIFFITH, A. perception and the categories. European Journal of Philosophy, 20 (2), pp. 193-222, 2012.
HANNA, R. Kant, science and human nature. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.
HEIDEGGER, M. The question concerning the thing: on kant’s doctrine of the transcendental principles. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield International, 2018.
HOULGATE, S. Hegel, McDowell, and perceptual experience: a response to John McDowell. In: Studies in German Idealism. McDowell and Hegel. Switzerland AG: Springer Nature, 2018.
KANT, I. Logic. Transl. Hartman, R. and Schwarz. W. New York: Dover Publications, 1988. [Log]
KANT, I. Concerning the ultimate ground of the differentiation of directions in space. In: Theoretical philosophy: 1755–1770. Transl. Walford, D. and Meerbote, R. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992. [GUGR]
KANT, I. Crítica da razão pura. Tradução de Manuela Pinto dos Santos e Alexandre Fradique Morujão. Lisboa: Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian, 5ª Ed., 2001. [KrV]
LAND, T. No Other use than in judgment?: kant on concepts and sensible synthesis. Journal of the History of Philosophy, 53(3), pp. 461-484, 2015.
McDOWELL, J. Mente e mundo. Tradução de J. V. G. Cuter. Aparecida: Ideias e Letras, 2005.
McDOWELL, J. Avoiding the myth of the given. In: Having the world in view: Essays on Kant, Hegel and Sellars, pp. 256-72. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009a.
McDOWELL, J. Having the World In View: Essays on Kant, Hegel and Sellars. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009b.
McDOWELL, J. Rationalism without dogmas. In: ADAMS, Z.; BROWNING, J. Giving a damn: essays in dialogue with John Haugeland. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2016.
McDOWELL, J. Travis on Frege, Kant and the given: comments on ‘unlocking the outer world’. In: GERSEL, J. et. al. (ed.) In the light of experience: essays on reasons and perception, pp. 23-35. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018.
McLEAR, C. Kant on animal consciousness. Philosophers’ Imprint, 11(15), pp. 1-16, 2011.
McLEAR, C. Kant on perceptual content. Mind, 125 (497), 95-144, 2016.
McLEAR, C. Kantian conceptualism/nonconceptualism. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2021 Edition). Disponível em: https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2021/entries/kant-conceptualism. Acesso em 13 de dez. de 2023.
PATON, H. J. Kant’s metaphysic of experience (Volume 1). London: G. Allen & Unwin, Ltd, 1936.
PEACOCKE, C. A study of concepts. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1992.
SCHULTING, D. Kantian non-conceptualism. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016.
SIEGEL, S. Precis of the contents of visual experience. Philos Stud, 163, pp. 813-816, 2013.
SIEGEL, S. The uneasy heirs of acquaintance. Philosophical Issues, 29, pp. 348-365, 2019.
STRAWSON, P. F. bounds of sense. London: Methuen, 1966.
TRAVIS, C. Perception: essays after Frege. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.
TRAVIS, C. The move, the divide, the myth and its dogma. In: GERSEL et al. (ed.). In the light of experience: Essays on Reasons and Perception. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018, pp. 23-35.
WILSON, K. Are the senses silent? In: DOBLER, T. and COLLINS, J. (eds.). The philosophy of Charles Travis: language, thought, and perception. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018.
Downloads
Published
How to Cite
Issue
Section
License
Copyright (c) 2025 Daniel Mendes Campos Xavier Debarry
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
Authors retain copyright of their works and grant Studia Kantiana the right of first publication.
Authors grant the publishers the right to link their articles in future databases.
Studia Kantiana uses the Creative Commons 4.0 (CC BY 4.0).
