The concept of internal experience between the first and second edition of the Critique of pure reason
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5380/sk.v23i1.95734Keywords:
internal experience, self-affection, refutation of idealism, external experience, solipsism.Abstract
The Refutation of idealism does not consist merely of a new method for presenting the arguments of the “Fourth paralogism” of the Critique of pure reason of 1781 and, thus, refuting skeptical or problematic idealism in a clearer or more convincing manner, but of a new refutation of idealism (KrV, B XXXIXn). In this sense, it is possible to say that this new refutation introduces some elements that alter the understanding of what was constituted by inner experience in the first edition of the Critique. That said, the present paper aims to discuss the change that the concept of inner experience underwent between the first (1781) and the second (1787) edition of the Critique, using as a parameter the argumentative framework defended in the “Refutation of idealism”. Therefore, it is argued that Kant alters the concept of inner experience to adjust it to the new refutation of idealism and, thus, respond to the accusations of solipsistic idealism.
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