Will (<i>boulêsis</i>) and consent (<i>sunkatathesis</i>) in Aristotle and Abelard: Acts of appetite (<i>orexis</i>) or reason (<i>logos</i>)?

Abstract

The central question raised in the present article concerns the ontologicalnature of the intentional act, previous to the proper moral action, in Aristotle’sand Abelard’s thinking. More precisely, we examine two subjects indirectly interconnected.First, we treat the secular problem of the exact nature of will (boulêsis)in Aristotle, which certainly refers to a rational act (logikos), the source of which is, however, the appetite (orexis). The second point is related to the notion ofconsent (consensus) in Abelard, which also raises the question of its voluntary orrational ontological character. Both topics are connected in so far as the Abelardianconsent is similar to the Aristotelian idea of choice (proairesis), and particularlyto that of the Stoic assent (sunkatathesis), and not, as some commentatorsbelieve, to the Augustinian notion of will as a free and spontaneous act. This identificationof the Abelardian consent with the Augustine’s will comes from a confusion,which is more terminological and perspectival than interpretative.