Causality and (dis)similarity in Descartes

Abstract

The article examines certain tensions generated between causality and (dis)similarity in the scope of relationship between idea and thing. Descartes’ starting point is that causality does not imply similarity. He must, however, recover this last notion; otherwise, the very notion of causality does not survive (and indeed, the truth). In this sense, Descartes needs to negotiate with the fact that, in general, a cause is eminent (and, therefore, unlike to the effect), whereas the doctrine of causality requires it to be, at least, formal (similar to it). This last requirement allows reintroducing in some way the notion of similarity, but makes it difficult to apprehend cognitive determinations in the direction in which causality (from cause to effect) are produced, which leads Descartes to give axiomatic and methodological primacy to effect.