The principle of sufficient reason in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason and its applications: the analogies, the antinomies and the regulative principles

Abstract

The purpose of this article is to indicate a possible relation between the principle of sufficient reason (PSR) and other concepts and principles involved in the Critique of Pure Reason, particularly that of causality, as exposed by Kant in the Second Analogy, Third Antinomy, and regulative principles. In general terms, two problems will be dealt with here: (1) what is the nature of the PSR? And (2) how does the relationship of the PSR to the concepts and principles mentioned happen? Regarding the first problem, the hypothesis that PSR is a principle of a logical character will be supported, and these condone will be defending the thesis that PSR is a logic that can have a valid and invalid application, both by understanding and by reason, as exemplified in the Second Analogy (valid application of the understanding), in regulative principles (valid application of reason), and the Third Antinomy (invalid application of the understanding and reason). The discussion of the reducibility (MELO; LONGUENESSE; HIRATA) or their reducibility (KAUARK) of the PSR to causality in the Second Analogy will also be mentioned, concerning which it will be indicated that there are restricted points of view in the face of the broader considerations on the definition and the possible applications of PSR.