The existentialist view (on the content of experience) defended

Authors

  • Roberto Horácio Sá Pereira Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ)

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.5380/dp.v9i2.26894

Keywords:

Existential content of perception, Relativized content, Particularity problem

Abstract

The aim of this paper is twofold: to consider in detail the objections against the existentialist view of the content of visual experience and to develop and defend a version of it that avoids these objections, solving, specifically, the so-called "particularity problem." The main thesis is that the existential content of visual experience must be understood as relativized, incomplete content (rather than a classical, complete proposition), modeled as a function of the sextuple of object, agent, time, location, causal relation, and world to truth-values.

Downloads

Published

2012-12-24

How to Cite

Sá Pereira, R. H. (2012). The existentialist view (on the content of experience) defended. DoisPontos, 9(2). https://doi.org/10.5380/dp.v9i2.26894

Issue

Vol. 9 No. 2 (2012): Percepção

Section

Perception

License

Copyright for articles published in this journal belongs to the author, with first publication rights for the journal. Because of appearing in this public access journal, the articles are free to use, with terms of reference, in educational and non-commercial applications.