Note on cartesian doubt

Abstract

The aim of this note is to formulate questions that make evident certain difficulties involved in understanding the methodical Cartesian doubt. It is a critical evaluation that starts from the following hypothesis: either the methodical doubt is unintelligible or it is not a doubt. Prima facie, the methodical doubt seems to be irrational, for in its scope we find propositions that seem to be paradigms of rationalit y. Some explanations of the intelligibility of the methodical doubt seem to take away its doubting character, like those that seek to make the methodical doubt and the belief compatible. The main questions dealt with in this note are: (1) What is the epistemic motivation for the methodical doubt? (2) Given what is available to the meditator in the First Meditation, can what is presented as a reason for doubting really be so regarded? (3) Is the methodical doubt compatible with the epistemic demands of practical life? (4) What is the nature of the attitude called “doubt” and what is its object?