Theory of definition and principle of causality in the deduction of the conatus

Abstract

In the deduction of conatus in Part III of Ethics, Spinoza presents the same conclusion to the finite modes that he did in Part I concerning the power of God: essence and existence do not separate and, ultimately, identify themselves. In God, given the definition of causa sui, this identity is “easily” explained in the case of modes. However, there seems to be a greater difficulty since, according to the de Deo, their essence does not involve existence. How can we reconcile two irreconcilable ideas, an “essence that does not involve existence”, with the intrinsic and necessary relation between essence and existence? How can we maintain that similar to substance, the essence and the existence of the modes do not separate? What binds one to another? This article proposes to clarify these questions through the articulation of two important themes in Spinoza’s philosophy: the notion of causality and the theory of definition.