Time and temporal intentionality in the middle Wittgenstein
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5380/dp.v6i1.16673Keywords:
tempo, Wittgenstein, memória, fenomenologia, relação interna, intencionalidade, memory, phenomenology, internal relation, intentionalityAbstract
This article focuses on the question of temporality in Wittgenstein’s
intermediary period. First, he establishes the evolution of the treatment the
philosopher gives to the ‘phenomenological’ idea, empiricist in origin, of an
incessantly flowing present of consciousness: at first simply adopted (in 1929) as
a description of immediate experience, this idea is then criticized in 1930-32 as
an expression of one of the most characteristic temptations of the philosophical spirit. The article goes on to examine, in a particular case (that of memory), the
way in which Wittgenstein deals with the effects of this myth on philosophical
reflection. Directed especially at Russell’s conception of mnemonic intentionality
(1921), Wittgenstein’s critique consists in revealing the confusions which lead to
the belief that memory can only maintain an external relation with its object. By
thus reestablishing the role of internal relations, Wittgenstein hoped to break the
spell of the myth of the present on the philosophy of memory.
