Hume’s skeptical non-realism

Abstract

The proponents of skeptical realism as an interpretation of Hume’s causal theory suggest the
philosopher held a belief in the existence of causality as an intrinsic property of the objects of knowledge and, concurrently, the impossibility to obtain such knowledge. However, there are scarce arguments in favor of the justification of that belief. In the present article, the intention is i) to briefly introduce the skeptical realist interpretation, in order to explain the relevance of the subject discussed; ii) to describe one of these arguments - presented by J. Wright; iii) based on a problem which will be pointed to it, to defend that the belief in the existence of causality as an intrinsic property of the objects of knowledge is anterior to the realm of justification of beliefs concerning concrete causal relations and independent from it. In the light of this, I conclude that Hume the philosopher cannot be considered a defender of skeptical realism.