The Concepts of Just and Unjust in Aristotle: between EN V, 1 and EN V, 9

Authors

  • Mateus de Campos Baldin Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, UFRGS, RS

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.5380/dp.v10i1.32156

Keywords:

Aristotle, Michel Villey, Justice, Nicomachean Ethics

Abstract

Some authors of Jurisprudence, especially Michel Villey, tried to present what they thought to be the aristotelic theory of justice, grounding in it their own theories. To Villey, pecifically, “the right” would be the correct translation of the Greek to dikaion. To defend, based on Aristotle, a conception of the just that refuses subjective elements of a theory of action is an error. And this error lies in ignoring a redefinition of to dikaion made by Aristotle in Chapter 9 of Book V of Nicomachean Ethics. There, Aristotle adds to the objective conditions of the just and the unjust (EN V, 1-7) some subjective conditions referring to person who suffers the action. Only after correctly understanding these conditions we will be able to correctly understand the aristotelic theory of justice. As Villey and other authors ignore it, they err interpreting Aristotle and using him to found their own theories.

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Published

2013-05-27

How to Cite

de Campos Baldin, M. (2013). The Concepts of Just and Unjust in Aristotle: between EN V, 1 and EN V, 9. DoisPontos, 10(1). https://doi.org/10.5380/dp.v10i1.32156

Issue

Vol. 10 No. 1 (2013): Justiça

Section

Justice

License

Copyright for articles published in this journal belongs to the author, with first publication rights for the journal. Because of appearing in this public access journal, the articles are free to use, with terms of reference, in educational and non-commercial applications.