Kantian constructivisms and the construction of the principles of justice in Rawls’ work

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to argue for the following theses. First, the theories of justice of Habermas and Rawls should be seen as two versions of kantian constructivism, understood as a metaethical approach that attempts to combine anti-realism and strong cognitivism. Second, the contrast with Habermas' "reconstructivist constructivism" helps to explain in which way Rawls' theory satisfies the claim to universal validity peculiar to strong cognitivism. In illuminating the fact that Rawls' constructivism is based on the reflective work of the individual consciousness, the contrast with Habermas enables to understand in which sense the concepts of reflective equilibrium and overlapping consensus indicate an ideal that claims universal validity, thereby denying the particularism involved in the coherentist and relativist interpretations of these concepts.