Ockham and the determinate truth on future contingent propositions

Abstract

This article deals with Ockham’s analysis of the problem, explained byAristotle in the ninth chapter of De Interpretatione, of determining the truth ofcontingent propositions about the future, as well as its relationship to whatOckham himself proposes, ‘in accordance with truth and faith’, on the subject. Inthis respect, three theses are generally proposed on the basis of Ockham’s readingof Aristotle: that Ockham regarded the Aristotelian solution as an error, andthus disagreed with it; that Ockham clearly saw the Aristotelian solution as pointingtowards a three-valued logic; and, finally, that Ockham denied the doctrine ofthe “necessity of the consequent”. Notwithstanding, it will be argued here thatonly the last of these is correct.