Revisiting the three conditions of the act properly virtuous in the Nicomachean Ethics

Abstract

This article intends to recover the interpretation that can be called traditional of the three conditions of the act properly virtuous presented in EN II 4, i.e., the knowledge, deliberately choosing the act by itself, and proceeding from a firm and not hesitant disposition. The focus of the analysis will be on the first and third conditions. I will try do show that the condition of knowledge can be understood as knowledge of the circumstances, as the act itself as virtuous and as the techniques or crafts that it may require. I will also try to justify the introduction of the term 'disposition' in the present translation, since the greek term 'hexis' does not occurs in the text analyzed. Finally, a note will be made in order to provide a more extensive justification to the interpretation advocated here to the extent that this interpretation goes in a contrary position to socratic intellectualism.