Knowledge, Truth, and Meaning

Abstract

This paper’s goal is to present a Wittgenstein’s argument against philosophicalrealism, the strong realism with respect to truth. Wittgenstein’s argumenthas the general form of a modus tollens whose conditional premise states thatstrong realism regarding truth implies the massive error hypothesis. The consequent’sdenial is based on the incompatibility between the massive error hypothesisand language’s essential normativity. Wittgenstein’s argument is also compatiblewith realism’s weak version regarding truth. In the last section I examineStroud’s argument against Austin’s thesis presupposed in his argument againstskepticism according to which truths about the usage of “knowledge” (and relatedexpressions) imply truths about knowledge. I try to show that Stroud’s argumentinvolves the type of realism targeted by Wittgenstein’s argument.