Grammar and Necessary Truth
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5380/dp.v6i2.14932Keywords:
Russell, Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Filosofia da linguagem, gramática, lógica, essência, representação, Philosophy of Language, grammar, logic, essence, representationAbstract
Wittgenstein objective is to show that Russell’s Theory of Types iscondemned to self dissolution. It can only be presented through statementswhich violate the very rules the theory intends to impinge on the whole oflanguage. On the other hand, if one takes it to be merely a system of rules regardingthe usage of signs, it becomes completely arbitrary.The theory of Types presents as an invention something which, from the Tractatus’point of view, could only be a discovery: the essential structure of realitywhich is supposed to be presented by language. And then we arrive in the Tractatusat the intermediary solution of an “ineffable essence”. The problem gets evenmore tangled when the Tractatus comes out unworkable and the idea of reality’sessential structure is jeopardized. Towards the end of the paper I try to offer aWittgenstein type of inquiry on what is left of the concept of necessity once weabandon the idea that reality is endowed with an essential structure which issupposed to be presented by language.Downloads
How to Cite
Cuter, J. V. G. (2009). Grammar and Necessary Truth. DoisPontos, 6(2). https://doi.org/10.5380/dp.v6i2.14932
Issue
Section
Articles

