Wittgenstein and the semantic theories of the visual a priori: Philosophical Remarks, chap. XVI & XX
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5380/dp.v6i1.13366Keywords:
geometrias, interpretações semânticas, sintaxe, Wittgenstein, Observações filosóficas, geometry, semantical interpretations, syntax, Philosophical Remarks, géométrie, interprétations sémantiques, syntaxeAbstract
In this article we intend to show that a problem shared by chapters XVI
and XX of the Philosophical Remarks is the applicability of geometrical concepts
and ‘propositions’ to physical and perceptual (especially visual) reality, and that
the way in which Wittgenstein broaches this problem differs radically, in spite of
apparent similarities, from that which characterizes theories of the visual a priori
in terms of stipulations (notably Carnap’s theory in 1922). The explanation of the
statute of statements about objects in visual space as syntactical rules and the
treatment of the problem of the application of our geometrical concepts to
perceptual reality in terms of practical conditions of use allows Wittgenstein to
dissolve, though not without some ambiguity of vocabulary, false ontological
appearances raised by theories which posit the existence of a universe of
discourse between physical bodies and numbers.
