Sympathy, morality and knowledge in Hume's philosophy

Abstract

This paper examines the view that while in A Treatise of Human Nature (1739-40) Hume presents himself as a Newtonian philosopher, in later works from the Essays, Moral, and Political (1741-42) to the History of England, he takes the role of a moralist as well, and aims to understand and to promote human virtue and happiness. To achieve this end he assigns a central role to the concept of ‘sympathy’ first, in the constitution of human societies; second, in the moral education of individuals; and last, in the study of historical and social phenomena. A parallel development occurs in Hume’s concept of ‘history’ and its relation to philosophy. After the Treatise, history – the laboratory of the Humean science of mind – becomes an exercise of moral evaluation, and although Hume contemplates past ages as a disinterested observer, he is an observer capable of sympathy. History also becomes a rhetorical exercise – Hume attempts to induce in his present - day readers a sentimental response attuned to a modem ideal of sociability. In this hypothesis, his moral science achieves a normative dime ns ion. By constituting itself into a programme of refinement of sensibility and discovery of conditions favorable to the virtues, it both deepens Hume’s naturalism and responds to new sceptical concerns.