Toward a Kantian theory of prudential irrationality
between intellectual error and volitional failure
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5380/dp.v22i3.100722Palavras-chave:
Kant, Instrumental Reason, Rational Agency, Hypothetical Imperative, Categorical Imperative, Normative ethicsResumo
This article investigates the conditions for a Kantian theory of prudential irrationality. Against Merle (2023), it argues that intellectual errors, such as incorrect beliefs, do not suffice to generate irrational actions. The analysis focuses instead on whether volitional failures can lead to prudentially irrational actions. To examine this, two interpretive models are considered: the negative model, inspired by Timmerman (2022), which denies prudential irrationality, and the positive model, developed by Korsgaard (2008), which affirms it. While Timmerman strips the Hypothetical Imperative of normativity, Korsgaard subordinates it to the Categorical Imperative. Both models face limits: the first excludes the possibility of instrumental irrationality; the second risks expanding the moral domain or weakening the link between freedom and the moral law. The challenge remains to explain how instrumental rationality is possible without reducing it to morality, while preserving its intrinsic tie to freedom.
Referências
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