Reason’s public use as a procedure: a contrast between Rawls and Habermas

Abstract

In order to find a comom ground of justification to principles and normsthat, under conditions of a cultural and social pluralism, could be publicly recognized, John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas reconstruct the point of view under wichit is possible to found impartially norms of action. But according to Habermas’sconception of democracy, the legitimacy of norms depends on the institutionalizationof procedures that foster deliberation and increase the chances of arriving atvalid decisons according to the public use of reason. This procedure refers to thediscursive exchange of reasons in wich participants strive to reach agreement solelyon the basis of the better argument, and it anchors the validity of norms in thepossibility of a rationally founded agreement on the part of all those who might beaffected, insofar as they take on the role of participants rational discourses.