

# SOME REMARKS ON *TODO N* IN BRAZILIAN PORTUGUESE

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The paper discusses the quantificational status of the universal quantifier phrase *todo N*, name bare universal phrase. In the first section, the hypothesis that there are two types of universal phrases in Brazilian Portuguese (BP, from now on) is showed to find empirical ground in several syntactic and semantic properties. In the second section, the hypothesis, raised by Negrão (2002), that *todo N* is not a quantifier but an indefinite in Heim's sense is explored. This hypothesis is not correct, because it cannot explain some semantic properties of *todo N*. The best way of doing so is to consider it not only a universal quantifier, but also a modal one. In the last section, we show that if our analysis is sound, then Enç's generalization concerning quantifiers should be revised. We propose to keep apart the notions of quantification and specificity.

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## Two types of universal quantifier phrases

I have argued elsewhere (Oliveira, 2002a; 2002b) that descriptively it is possible to identify two universal quantifiers types in BP, exemplified by the following examples:

- (1) Toda criança chora.  
UQ child cry.  
Every child cries.
- (2) Toda a criançada chora.  
UQ definite article singular child (group of) cry.  
The whole group of children cries.
- (3) Todas as crianças choram.  
UQ definite article plural child plural cry.  
All the children cry.

In contemporary BP there is no bare plural quantifier phrase, exemplified below:

- (4) \* Todas crianças choram.  
UQ plural child plural cry.  
All children cry.

The proposal in Oliveira gathers (2) and (3) together. In (1), the quantifier combines with a common noun directly, while both in (2) and in (3) the universal quantifier combines with a determiner phrase, be it singular or plural. Peres (1992), describing universal phrases in Portuguese, claims that the item *o* (the) that follows the quantifier is a spurious particle, void of meaning. We shall show that such an analysis cannot explain several syntactic and semantic differences between defined universal phrases – which are composed out of a determiner phrase – and bare universal phrases. In order to do so, we must ascribe a semantic role to the defined article.

Flotation and anaphoric recovering are two of the properties, which allow us to distinguish two types of quantifier phrases in BP, because flotation is only possible with sentences (2) and (3), that is with the defined universal phrase:

- (5) \* Criança toda chora.
- (6) A criança toda chora.
- (7) As crianças todas choram.

Anaphoric recovering is either very difficult (dependent of heavy contextual factors) or impossible with the bare quantifier phrase, whereas it is absolutely normal with the defined one:

- (8) \* A criança, toda ela chora.
- (9) A criança, toda ela chora.
- (10) As crianças, todas elas choram.

Based on Matthewson' suggestion concerning the behavior of *every* and *all* in English, Oliveira argues that the bare universal quantifier phrase combines with a predicate, type  $\langle e, t \rangle$ , and generates a quantifier phrase, type  $\langle \langle e, t \rangle, t \rangle$ . The universal quantifier must be of type  $\langle \langle e, t \rangle, \langle \langle e, t \rangle, t \rangle \rangle$ , as the traditional analysis, of which Heim and Kratzer (1998) is one example, previews. Such an analysis cannot be directly applied to the defined universal phrase, however. Since the universal quantifier is combined with a determiner phrase, which is of type  $\langle e \rangle$ , an argument not a predicate, it must be of type  $\langle e, \langle \langle e, t \rangle, t \rangle \rangle$ .

Such an analysis explains the distinct behavior of *todo N* and defined universal phrase. Flotation is only possible with defined phrases because the universal quantifier is combined with a full determiner phrase, that is, a phrase that stands on its own, precisely because it is of argumental type. Flotation cannot happen with the bare universal phrase because the universal quantifier is combined with a common noun, which cannot be a full nominal phrase, because it must be bounded by an operator (not necessarily a quantifier, however!).

Anaphoric recovering is also explained by the same reasoning. Anaphoric linking is only possible when it recovers an individual, that is, something of type  $\langle e \rangle$ . We will see, in the next section, that the above semantic structure also explains some other properties of *todo N*. Notice that such an analysis attributes to the defined article a semantic role: it denotes an individual, be it a particular individual or a plural (group) individual. Thus, Peres (1992) proposal cannot be right.

Matthewson (2001) suggests that every is not a quantifier, precisely because “quantifiers actually requires sisters of argumental type”. If this is so then we have reasons to believe that *todo* in the bare structure, *todo N*, is not a quantifier after all. This paper aims at further investigating such a hypothesis. In order to do so, it will deepen the comparison between the bare universal phrase, *todo N*, and the defined universal, *todo o N*.

## Bare and definite universal phrases in subject position

The first to be noticed is that the following sentence is not acceptable in BP:

- (13) \* *Toda a criança chora.*  
UQ definite article singular child (common noun) cry.  
The whole child cries.

Oliveira (2002) suggests that the defined universal phrase can only have discontinuous interpretation. This would explain why sentence (13) is unacceptable. According to Peres (1992), there are two types of quantification in Portuguese: the continuous and the discontinuous ones. Continuous quantification, roughly speaking, counts individuals of a set, while discontinuous quantification takes an individual in its totality. Sentence (14) below is an example of discontinuous interpretation:

- (14) O menino todo se machucou.  
Definite article singular boy UQ himself hurt.  
The boy got all hurt.

Nonetheless, Oliveira's reasoning is not correct, since it is possible to have continuous reading with definite universal phrase, given that the head noun of the phrase is a group noun. This is the case with sentence (2), repeated here for convenience:

- (15) Toda a criançada chora.

We will be comparing (15) with sentence (1), also repeated here for convenience:

- (16) Toda criança chora.

Do they mean the same? Are they synonymous? The hypothesis we will be developing throughout this paper is that they are not synonymous. Sentence (15) is interpreted as being about some specific group of children that happen to be crying; thus *chora* receives an episodic reading while it is interpreted generically in (16). Sentence (16) states a law about children behavior. Such a contrast may be explained by the presence of the definite article. In the definite universal, the definite article takes a particular individual in its denotation, be it an atomic individual (sentence (14), which will have in BP a discontinuous reading) or a group individual (sentence (15), which may either have a continuous or a discontinuous reading). As a first approximation, sentence (15) is episodic whereas sentence (16) is non-episodic.

Thus, the definite universal phrase is always specific in Enç's sense (1991). This seems to be due to the presence of the definite article. Defined universal phrases refer to particular individuals that are known to speaker and

hearer. Thus the least we can say is that defined universal phrases presuppose that speaker and hearer take for granted the existence of those individuals. It is some sort of partitive construction. *Todo N* cannot be specific, it is never a partitive, and it does not presuppose existence.

The hypothesis that defined phrase is “episodic” compared with bare universal phrase which is “non episodic” finds support in the fact that defined phrases may well happen in episodic contexts, while bare universal never occur in such contexts:

- (17) A criançada toda se machucou.  
The whole group of child got hurt or the whole group got all hurt.
- (18) \* Toda a criança se machucou.  
The whole child got hurt.

Moreover, progressive is only possible with the defined universal phrase:

- (19) \* Toda criança está brincando.  
Every child is playing.
- (20) Toda a criançada está brincando.  
The whole group of child is playing.

Finally, defined universal phrases may combine explicitly with a partitive while bare universal phrases cannot:

- (21) Toda a criançada da festa se machucou.  
The whole group of child in the party got hurt.
- (22) ? Toda criança da festa se machucou.  
Every child of the party got hurt.

Sentence (22) is not completely unacceptable. In section 4 an explanation for this fact is given.

The conclusion to be drawn is that the presence of the definite article in the definite universal phrase explains why sentences with the defined universal phrase are interpreted “episodically”. Sentences with the bare universal quantifier in subject position get, on the other hand, the status of a law.

## Bare and definite universal phrase in object position

What about the object position? Some authors (Negrão, 2002; Vazatta-Dias, 2001; Gomes, 2002) argue that bare universal is not possible in object position. Gomes illustrates her point with the following example:

- (23) \* Ele canta toda canção.  
           He sings UQ song.  
           He sings every song.

However sentence (24) is fine in BP:

- (24) Ele canta todas as canções.  
           He sings UQ plural definite article plural songs.  
           He sings all the songs.

Once again, the definite universal phrase in (24) carries some sort of specificity that explains the acceptability of the sentence. It is referring to a particular (plural) individual, even if this individual is quite numerous. Sentence (23) seems to be unacceptable due to the semantics of *todo*. *Todo N* seems to refer to any possible set of individuals that is defined by the common noun property. In other words, in sentence (23) the speaker is referring to any possible

song, including those that do not exist and will never exist. Thus, uttering sentence (23) the speaker is committing herself with an obviously false statement, since it is not possible that anyone may sing any possible song. The presence of the definite article is again quite relevant here, since it picks up a particular individual. But we are now refining our hypothesis. We are suggesting that *todo N* carries some trace of modality: whenever we use *todo N* we are not talking about particular individuals, but about possible individuals which may be characterized by the property expressed by the common noun.

The unacceptability of sentence (23) would then be explained by the semantics of *todo N*. It is not correct, however, to claim that bare universal phrases are not possible in object position. In our empirical survey of both written and oral corpora,<sup>1</sup> we found several examples of bare universal phrases in object position. Here are some of them:

- (25) Empacado desde 1995, o projeto veda toda disposição sobre a adoção de tutela ou guarda em conjunto, mesmo que filhos de um parceiro. (*Folha de São Paulo*, 31 de março de 2002)
- (26) O filtro X elimina toda coloração. (Advertisement of a filter water)
- (27) Ela (Helen Keller) foi uma daquelas pessoas que teriam todas as razões para amaldiçoar a vida, mas que escolhem o caminho contrário e acabam superando todo obstáculo. (*Super interessante*, junho 2002, p. 24)

Dayal (1998) has noticed the same phenomenon with respect to *any*. She shows that sentence (28) below is bad while sentence (29) is fine. The same contrast is found with *todo N* in BP, see sentences (30) and (31) the translations of (28) and (29) respectively:

- (28) \* John talked to any woman.
- (29) John talked to any woman who came up to him.

1 We have checked the Brazilian and European Portuguese corpus as well as Varsul.



- (30) \* João conversou com toda mulher.  
 (31) João conversou com toda mulher que ele encontrou.

According to Dayal, it was LeGrand who first described this phenomenon and named it “subtrigging”. Dayal argues that *any* is always possible if it is modified. Notice that the universal phrases in sentences (25) to (27) are all modified. In sentence (25) it is explicitly modified by an adverbial phrase; in sentence (26), *toda coloração* (all coloration) is interpreted as being modified by something like: *que a água pode ter* (that the water may have). The same reasoning may be applied to sentence (27), where *todo obstáculo* (all obstacles) is contextually modified by something like: *que ele/ela encontra* (that he/she may find). What seems to be happening is that bare universal phrases are possible in object position whenever a relative clause or some other linguistic procedure explicitly modifies it; such linguistic material may be contextually provided. There is no such a restriction with respect to the defined universal phrase, be it singular or plural:

- (32) Maria canta todo o cancioneiro.  
       Maria sings the whole songbook.  
 (33) Maria canta todas as canções.  
       Maria sings all the songs.

## Is *todo N* an indefinite?

Before explaining the facts described in the last section, it is important to take into consideration Matthewson’s suggestion applied to BP that *todo N* may be something other than a quantifier. This hypothesis finds support in Negrão (2002) who, in order to explain the behavior of *todo N* in contrast with *cada N* (each), claims that sentences with *todo N* are under specified for the feature Distributive, since it may or may not have a distributive reading. *Cada* (each), on the other hand, carries such a feature, and must check it; otherwise the sentence is ungrammatical. The author also shows that *todo* e *cada* do not

occur in the same contexts. *Todo* is licensed as the subject of a sentence, in which the object position is a group quantifier phrase. *Cada* is not licensed in this context:

- (34) a.\* Cada homem ama aquela mulher.  
Each man loves that woman.  
b. Todo homem ama aquela mulher.  
Every man loves that woman.

(34.b) is possible because *todo N* is not necessarily distributive. Moreover, *todo* but not *cada* may be the subject of an individual level predicate:

- (35) a.\* Cada homem é inteligente.  
Each man is clever.  
b. Todo homem é inteligente.  
Every man is clever.

Thus, *todo N* is licensed in “generic” (non-episodic) sentences, while *cada* is not.

Finally, *todo* does not support the inverted scope reading, that is, it does not have wide scope whenever it occupies other positions besides being the subject of the sentence. Though Negrao is right with respect to example (36), her generalization may not be correct, because, as we will see in section 3.1, *todo N* may have inverted scope reading. Sentence (36) is unacceptable due to its existential context, and to the non-modification of the bare universal. Compare it with sentence (37):

- (36) \*Aquele médico examinou todo paciente.  
That doctor saw every patient.

- (37) Aquele médico examinou todo paciente que estava com meningite.  
That doctor saw every patient who was with meningitis.

Her conclusion is that *todo* is not a truly quantifier phrase, but rather an indefinite in Heim's sense, whereas *cada* (*each*) is a true quantifier. As an indefinite, *todo* introduces a variable that ends up unselectively bound by sentential operators.

## Some problems with such an analysis

First, if *todo* is an indefinite, why it is not licensed in episodic sentences and why it cannot occupy the object position? Negrão (2002) claims that *todo* cannot occur in episodic sentences, because it carries the feature [+ universal]: "The operators binding the variable introduced by *todo* DQP [Distributive Quantifier Phrase] need to have a meaning compatible with the trace [+ universal] of *todo*. This is the reason why when it is in object position of a existentially quantified VP, the sentence becomes ungrammatical".<sup>2</sup> (Negrão, 2002, p. 203). This is not a satisfactory answer, however. First, because it seems rather contradictory to claim at the same time that *todo* is an indefinite and that it carries the feature [+ universal].

Second, because sentence (23), *Ele canta toda canção*, is not an episodic sentence, but *todo N* is not allowed. Moreover, as we have shown *todo* is possible in existential contexts both in object and in subject positions given that it is somehow modified:

- (37) Toda criança que veio para a festa está brincando.  
UQ child singular who came to the party is playing.

2 My own translation: *Os operadores prendendo a variável introduzida pelo todo DQP precisam ter significado compatível com o traço [+ universal] de todo. É por isso que, quando em posição de objeto de um VP quantificado existencialmente, a sentença torna-se inaceitável.*

The same happens with respect to the possibility of bare universal phrase to occupy the object position: it is allowed in such a position if it is modified, if it happens in a complex sentence. See the contrast between the sentences below:

- (38) \* João leu todo livro.  
João read UQ book singular.  
(39) João leu todo livro que caiu em suas mãos.  
João read UQ book that felt into his hands.

Once again, the insertion of a relative clause modifying the universal phrase makes the sentence acceptable. One should notice that both (37) and (39) exemplify a very special type of episodic sentences, because they seem to state a possibility within a given temporal interval. In (39) the speaker is not asserting that John read all possible books, but rather that he read every possible book which was available to him. The same is true with respect to (37): the speaker is not asserting that all children in the universe are playing – an obviously false statement –, but rather that all children who possibly came to the party were playing.

If Negrão's claim concerning the feature [+universal] were right, then sentences (37) and (39) should be both unacceptable, since there would be a conflict between incompatible features: the morphology would carry the feature [+existential] while *todo*, the feature [+universal]. Finally, if we substitute the universal quantifier by an indefinite article such as *um*, we get a totally different interpretation: the resulting sentence only accepts an existential reading. Thus, the substitution for an indefinite does not yield a generic interpretation. Sentence (40) has only an existential reading:

- (40) João leu um livro que caiu em suas mãos.  
João read indefinite book that felt into his hands.

Why in (39) the interpretation is “universal” though in an episodic context, whereas with an indefinite the only possibility is an existential reading? If *todo*

*N* were an indefinite it should behave as an indefinite, but that does not seem to be the case.

Thus, attributing distinct semantic structures to the bare universal quantifier and to the defined universal phrase explains some facts about universal phrases in BP, but not all of them, in particular it does not explain why BUP cannot be in object position. The hypothesis that *todo* in structures like *todo N*, BUP, is not a quantifier, but an indefinite is puzzling because if it were so then it should happen in object position, and be possible in episodic sentences. Postulating a feature [+universal] seems to be a rather *ad hoc* solution. Finally, *todo* may occur both in episodic statements and in object position given that it is modified by a relative clause. Within such contexts it is interpreted as some sort of temporalized “universal”.

### Is *todo* a universal quantifier?

According to Dayal, subtrigging and modality challenge the view that *any* is an indefinite, and support her thesis that it is a quantifier. If her reasoning is plausible to BP data, then the thesis that *todo N* is a universal finds support. The possibility of subtrigging challenges the hypothesis that *any*, and in our case *todo*, is an indefinite because an indefinite in such a position should not have universal force, as it was shown in sentence (40). But all sentences with modified bare universal have “universal” force. Sentence (39) receives the following interpretation: if something is a book that who is in a situation of having being accessible to John, then John read it. Notice that this sentence does not assert that there actually is any book that John read, but rather states a conditional.

Dayal claims that only universals, not indefinites, can take modifiers like *almost* and *absolutely*, and only them are compatible with exception phrases. Once again, if this is so, then *todo N* should be considered a universal, since it may combine with *quase* (almost), sentence (41), it admits exceptions, sentence (42), and it may be modified by *certamente* (*absolutely*),<sup>3</sup> sentence (43):

3 **Absolutely** is a trick word, but Michaelis gives *realmente* as a possibility. [C/AUTOR: manter itálico em oi?]

- (41) Quase todo menino brinca.  
Almost UQ boy play.
- (42) Todo menino exceto o João brinca.  
UQ boy except John play.
- (43) Certamente todo menino brinca.  
Absolutely UQ boy play.

Thus, we should conclude that *todo* is a universal quantifier.

*Any*, shows Dayal, cannot combine with pre-nominal modification, whereas it is fine with post-nominal modification:

- (44) \* Mary talked to any angry student.
- (45) Mary talked to any student who was angry.

The same phenomenon is found in BP, though we cannot describe it as pre and post nominal modification. Notice that both (46) and (47) show post-nominal modifications:

- (46) \* João conversou com todo aluno bravo.  
João talked to UQ student angry.
- (47) João conversou com todo aluno que estava bravo.  
João talked to UQ student who was angry.

Dayal's explanation for the above contrast is absolutely plausible as an explanation to the phenomenon in BP, and it points towards considering *any* and *todo* as quantifiers. Roughly speaking, quantifiers introduce tripartite structures, which are available in (45) and (47) but not in (44) and (46). Let's clarify her reasoning. Within her approach, *any* is a quantifier; thus, it engenders tripartite structures independently of the tense-aspect of the main verb. This explains the unacceptability of sentence (44) above. Choosing *any*, a speaker

commits herself with every possible situation, this is the reason why it is not licensed in episodic sentences, because the speaker would at the same time be talking about every possible situation and a particular situation. Modification makes the statement a claim about possible situations that may happen in temporal closed intervals. This is the reason why *any* is said to be inherently modal.

If this analysis is correct, sentence (47) asserts the following: all possible student situations that extend into a student situation in which they are angry and fall within the interval denoted by the main predicate are students to whom Mary talked. Thus, according to this, *any* is a universal quantifier the domain of which is a set of possible individuals. Sentence (47) would then be attributed the following semantic structure:

$$(48) \quad \forall s, x [\text{student}(x, s) \& C(s) \& \exists s'' [s < s'' \& P(s'')] \& \text{angry}(x, s'')] \exists s' [s < s' \& \text{talk}(m, x, s')].$$

It says that all possible student situations extend into a situation located at a particular interval of time where students are angry which extend into a situation where Mary talked to all of them.

The hypothesis that *any* is inherently modal also explains three other properties: essentiality, counterfactual inferences, and lack of existential commitments. These properties are characteristic of *todo N* as well. In this section, we will only deal with essentiality, leaving counterfactuality and lack of existential commitments to section “what is a quantifier after all?”.

If we compare *any* and *every*, says Dayal, we find that *any* requires an essential reading while *every* is compatible with an accidental reading. According to her *any* differs from *every* in denoting a relation between sets of intensions, rather than inclusion of sets. *Any* is then treated as creating an intensional context, rather like *necessarily all*. In this sense, it would be more like a modal operator. Though the tests proposed by Dayal to isolate essential from accidental readings are not so conclusive, at least with respect to BP, they show that the bare universal phrase, if compared to the defined universal quantifier, requires an essential reading. Sentence (49) is ambiguous between a future and a conditional interpretation, whereas sentence (50) may only be ascribed a

conditional reading. This difference seems to be due to the fact that (49) may receive an accidental reading while (50) only has an essential interpretation:

- (49) João vai participar de todas as instituições.  
João will participate on UQ plural plural definite article institutions.
- (50) João vai participar de toda instituição.  
João will participate on UQ institution.

### Saeboe's analysis of free choice items

Though Saeboe (2001) argues that Dayal's proposal is wrong, because "it seems wrong to ascribe an inherent modality to *any*" (p. 770), he agrees that *any* is a universal quantifier, and that sentences with *any* are modal. Their divergence concerns the way to analyze the modal aspect. According to Saeboe *any* is a universal quantifier that has to quantify into modal contexts. Here we will reproduce some of Saeboe arguments sustaining the thesis that *any* is a universal quantifier.

The author's first argument concerns the validity of inferences such as the following one:

- (51) a. Ela pode cantar toda canção desse álbum.  
She can sing every/any song of that album.  
b. *Aquarela do Brasil* é uma canção desse álbum.  
*Aquarela do Brasil* is a song of that album.  
c. Ela pode cantar *Aquarela do Brasil*.  
She can sing *Aquarela do Brasil*.

This is not a surprising outcome, since *todo* is a universal. The point of the argument, however, is the following: if the quantifier *todo* is substituted in the first premise for an indefinite such as *uma*, the generic reading vanishes



away, and the inferences is no longer valid. Thus the quantificational force must be located in the universal quantifier *todo*, and not in the morphological system.

*Any* can have inverse scope over other quantifies. Saeboe argues that this property shows that *any* is a quantifier, since this fact is “consistent with the hypothesis that Free Choice Items can undergo Quantifier Raising (or be subject to some other scooping mechanism). If Saeboe’s reasoning is sound, then *todo* should be a quantifier, since it may take inverse scope over other quantifiers:

- (52) Duas pessoas podem usar todo programa da loja.  
Two people can use every/all program in this store.

Sentence (52) has two readings. Even though Negrão (2002) claims that differently from *cada* (each) *todo* cannot have inverted scope reading, it is possible to have a distributive reading of sentence (53.b). If this is so, *todo N* may undergo Quantifier Raising:

- (53) a. Maria tem um vestido para cada ocasião.  
b. Maria tem um vestido para toda ocasião.

Finally, Saeboe (2001) reproduces one of Dayal’s arguments in connection with an example translated below to BP:

- (54) a. Um leão é geralmente majestático.  
A lion is usually majestic.  
b. Todo leão é geralmente majestático.  
Every/all lion is usually majestic.

(54.a) allows an individual-level interpretation of *majestático* (majestic), while (54.b) only allows a stage-level interpretation. “The reason may be that *a lion* has a bound interpretation where *usually* quantifies over lions, whereas *any lion* is itself quantificational, quantifying over possible lions, so that there are only occasions left for *usually* to quantify over” (p. 762). The same reasoning and interpretation applies to BP. Thus, one should conclude that *todo* has quantificational force of its own.

Saeboe warns, “In claiming that FCIs are quantifiers with universal force, I (Saeboe) am not claiming that they are ordinary universals. (...) ignoring the possibility that FCIs might be universal with special traits” (2001, p. 757). *Any* is a special type of universal because it requires a modal context. This is what explains its impossibility in sentences where the bare phrase is not modified. According to the author there are two ways to facilitate a modal reading of a sentence: “the verb may carry a presupposition which can be accommodated into the restrictor of the operator; second, a modified NP can provide material for a restrictor” (2001, p. 746). This latter gives a different, though compatible, explanation from Dayal’s, for subtriggering: modification may provide more descriptive material, which help to partition the sentence into restrictor and nuclear scope of an overt or covert operator. “It can be argued, claims Saeboe, that the relative clause facilitates a reading of the sentence as a conditional through the interpretative mechanism known as Semantic Partition (Krifka, 1995)” (2001, p. 744).

Both Dayal’s and Saeboe’s analyses of *any* if applied to BP show not only that *todo* is a quantifier, rather than an indefinite, but that it carries some trait of modality. We will not compare Dayal’s and Saeboe’s solution to *any*, but rather take the suppositions that they both share: the fact that *any* is a universal but not an ordinary universal. For Dayal, it is not ordinary because it is inherently modal; for Saeboe it requires the presence of a modal in the scope of the universal quantifier. Thus, they both agree that *any* sentences are modal, but modality enters into the story by very different doors. A way of perceiving such difference is looking at how subtriggering is interpreted in each of these proposals. In Dayal’s, it saves the statement, made intensional by the FCI, from being trivially false, whereas for Saeboe’s, it helps transforming the extensional context into an intensional one, by allowing a tripartite structure.

## What is a quantifier after all?

The bare universal, *todo N*, but not Defined universal phrase, *todos os N*, only expresses essentiality. DUP may have an accidental reading. Another distinction, closely linked to modality, is that *todo N* necessarily involves lack of existential commitments, while DUP may be interpreted as triggering a presupposition of existence. Traditionally, standard universal quantification is vacuous if the domain is the empty set. Thus, it is generally held to carry the presupposition that the domain is non-empty. If we compare BUP with DUP we see that BUP requires absence of existential commitment, in a way it is not taking about “things that actually exist”. Let’s make this point.

Differently from the English *every*, the bare universal in BP cannot quantify over contextually specified subsets. Imagine the following context, which was taken from Matthewson (2001), who was arguing for a specific reading of *every*: There were many linguists and philosophers at the party last night... Within such a context, one may say (55) felicitously, but (56) is just unacceptable:

- (55) Todos os lingüistas ficaram bêbados.  
UQ definite article plural linguists get (past) drunk.
- (56) \* Todo lingüista ficou bêbado.  
UQ linguist get (past) drunk.

The impossibility of sentence (56) shows that *todo* lacks existential commitment.

According to Milsark’s (apud Enç, 1991) criterion of definiteness both BUP and DUP should be considered a strong determiner, since neither of them can occur in existential contexts. Strong determiners are always quantificational. It is not possible to say, out of the blue, the following sentences:

- (57) \* Tem toda a criançada (no prédio).  
There is UQ definite article child collectively (in the building).
- (58) \* Tem toda criança (no prédio).  
There is UQ child collectively (in the building).

This fact endorses our main thesis that *todo* is a quantifier, since strong determiners are thought to be quantificational. However, it is a widespread belief in the literature that strong quantifiers cannot happen within existential sentences precisely because they presuppose existence. But if this is so, then our analysis of *todo N* as well as Dayal's and Saeboe's ones are false.

We reach the same paradoxical situation if we follow Enç's path (1991). The author correctly claims that partitives are necessarily specific; then the bare universal cannot be specific, because it cannot be partitive. This is so, precisely because BUP lacks existential commitment. But then it be a quantifier, given that Enç's claims that "all quantifiers are specific" (1991, p. 11). If Enç's generalization is right, then both Dayal's and Saeboe's proposals about *any* should be wrong, since both argue that *any* is a universal quantifier which lacks existential import, thus it could not be specific in Enç's sense.

As a way out of this paradoxical situation we propose to keep apart the notions of quantification and presupposition of existence (specificity). Such reasoning has the advantage of explaining why sentence (57) is possible if it is in context, whereas sentence (58) is simple unacceptable. Once again the presence of the definite article plays an important semantic role: the notion of specificity, and the presupposition of existence, seems to be tied not to the quantifier, but to the definite article which denotes an individual. Its absence in the bare universal phrase makes it possible to denote possible individuals. Modification is a way of restricting the domain of quantification of the bare universal.

## Conclusion

We showed that there are some structural differences between *todo N*, named BUP, and *todos os N*, DUP, which may be explained by Matthewson's (2001) suggestion. If our semantic proposal is correct, then Peres (1992) claim that the presence of the definite article in the quantifier phrase is vacuous is not right. The semantic structures attributed to BUP and DUP lead to the hypothesis that *todo N* was not a quantifier. Such a hypothesis finds resonance in Negrão's (2002) proposal that claims that *todo N* is an indefinite in Heim's sense. Dayal's (1998) and Saeboe's (2001) analyses of *any* were used to show that *todo N* is a universal after all, not an indefinite. Moreover it is a modal, either intrinsically modal, as Dayal suggests, or as Saeboe suggests, it needs a modal under its scope. The discussion of Enç's generalization was brought up in order to show

that if considering *todo* as a quantifier is a better solution, then Enç's generalization needs to be revised. Our proposal is to keep apart quantification from specificity. Specificity is given by the presence of the definite article. The quantifier itself expresses quantification. Such a proposal opens up the possibility of a class of non-specific (perhaps modal) quantifiers, of which *todo N* is a central example.

## ABSTRACT

Several syntactic and semantic properties of *todo N*, named bare universal phrase (BUP), and *todo(s) o(s) N(s)*, defined universal phrase (DUP), may be explained by attributing to each quantifier phrase a semantic structure. If our semantic proposal is correct, then Peres's (1992) claim that the presence of the definite article in the quantifier phrase is vacuous is not right. The semantic structures attributed to BUP and DUP lead to the hypothesis that *todo N* was not a quantifier. Such a hypothesis finds resonance in Negrão's proposal (2002) that claims that *todo N* is an indefinite in Heim's sense. Dayal's (1998) and Saeboe's (2001) analyses of any are used to show that *todo N* is a universal, not an indefinite. Moreover it is a modal. The discussion of Enç's generalization is brought up in order to show that if considering *todo* as a quantifier is a better solution, then Enç's generalization needs to be revised. Our proposal is to keep apart quantification from specificity. Specificity is given by the presence of the definite article. The quantifier itself expresses quantification. Such a proposal opens up the possibility of a class of non-specific (perhaps modal) quantifiers, of which *todo N* is a central example.

*Key-words: quantification, formal semantics, Brazilian Portuguese.*

## RESUMO

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