

## Practical rationality for poverty mitigation policies – A comparison between Onora O’Neill and Alasdair MacIntyre

Racionalidade prática para políticas de mitigação da pobreza – Uma comparação entre Onora O’Neill e Alasdair MacIntyre

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**Abstract:** In this article, we will present some epistemic aspects of an approach that we will conveniently call - and not from a rigorous historical pretension - “Aristotelian”, such as that of Alasdair MacIntyre, and epistemic aspects of an approach that we will also conveniently call “Kantian”, such as that of Onora O’Neill. Our choice in comparing these two specific approaches and their respective strong points is justified because their attention to analysis of deliberation and action seem to deal successfully with the problem of the relevant descriptions. Our hypothesis is that the presentation of these different perspectives, in terms of practical rationality for the formulation of poverty mitigation policies, would allow us to verify that the Aristotelian approach is contextually efficient, while the Kantian approach is universally demanding. However, if we take into account that a certain international political and economic conjuncture makes poverty mitigation difficult, the addressing of this problem would need to occur in a globally efficient and universally demanding manner. In this sense a Kantian theory of obligation seems to provide epistemic requirements necessary for the formulation of efficient policies.

**Keywords:** Practical reasoning; poverty; obligation; justice; beneficence; virtue.

**Resumo:** Neste artigo, apresentaremos certos aspectos epistêmicos de uma abordagem que chamaremos convenientemente - e não a partir de rigorosa pretensão histórica- de “aristotélica”, como aquela de Alasdair MacIntyre e aspectos epistêmicos de uma abordagem que também chamaremos convenientemente de “kantiana”, como aquela de Onora O’Neill. Nossa escolha em comparar essas duas abordagens específicas e seus respectivos pontos fortes se justifica porque a atenção delas à análise da deliberação e da ação parece lidar com sucesso em respeito ao problema das descrições relevantes. Nossa hipótese é que a apresentação dessas diferentes perspectivas, em termos de raciocínios práticos para a formulação de políticas de mitigação da pobreza, nos permitiria verificar que a abordagem “aristotélica” é contextualmente eficiente, enquanto a abordagem “kantiana” é universalmente exigente. No entanto, se levarmos em consideração que certa conjuntura internacional política e econômica dificulta a mitigação da pobreza, o enfrentamento desse problema precisaria ocorrer de forma globalmente eficiente e universalmente exigente. Nesse sentido, uma teoria kantiana da obrigação parece fornecer requisitos epistêmicos necessários para a formulação de políticas eficientes.

**Palavras-chave:** Razão prática; pobreza; obrigação; justiça; beneficência; virtude.



## 1. Introduction

In this article, we will present certain epistemic aspects that underlie some political decision-making procedures that could attempt to mitigate poverty, with attention to two different approaches that we will call each one of them as “Aristotelian” and “Kantian”. In the expression “poverty mitigation” we try to assimilate other types of political challenges, such as “development promotion” and “hunger eradication”. We also highlight that it is not our propose to do historical examinations that would assess Aristotelian or Kantian rigor in the perspectives studied here, that is, whether the authors presented here are a genuine Aristotelian or a genuine Kantian. Moreover, our aim is not to contrast the normative bases of a deontological approach with a virtue-based approach, but to present such comparative framework in terms of their different scope possibilities. The option for these two approaches is justified because their normative bases, although divergent, seem to respond with some success to what contemporary philosophy of action treats as the problem of the relevant description. We will discuss this in the next section.

Those two different approaches seem both methodologically attentive to the analysis of deliberation and action, in which the practical rationality has a political activity as a conclusion. We suggest that those theoretical perspectives may rise as Aristotelian in the form of a “theory of virtues”, or as Kantian in the form of a “theory of obligation”. The Aristotelian perspective, in the form of a “theory of virtues” will be presented as that advocated by Alasdair MacIntyre, while the Kantian perspective, in the form of a “theory of obligation” will be presented as that advocated by Onora O’Neill. We suggest that these different epistemic approaches can be compared in this way: the Aristotelian based perspective of a practical rationality is explained in terms of moral and intellectual qualities and the Kantian based perspective of practical rationality is explained by principles that determine action, which are divided into perfect duties and imperfect duties.

We therefore try to place these different approaches as candidates for a philosophical examination of the relation between practical rationality and poverty mitigation policies, with the hypothesis that the Aristotelian approach applies more efficiently to local policies, while the Kantian approach seems to be more promising for the establishment of global policies.

There could be several theoretical possibilities inspired in different normative basis to guide policies of poverty mitigation, but we accompany Onora O’Neill’s proposal according to which there are four necessary requirements to provide principles, rules or standards that would have – if we take it in terms of a practical syllogism - an appropriate action for mitigation of poverty as conclusion. Here are the requirements: 1) provision of universal standards for action (we will call this requirement “universality”), 2) criticism of current moral concepts and standards, 3) accessibility and 4) guide for action (O’NEILL, 1986, p.121-123)<sup>1</sup>. We also highlight that those four requirements seem to fit the methodology that we consider as attentive to the analysis of deliberation and action, since they may function as premises of a practical syllogism that would have an action as a conclusion.

In the next section we will present an important challenge imposed by the analysis of deliberation and action which, in our view, the Aristotelian and Kantian approaches have the advantage to give positive responses.

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<sup>1</sup>We suggest that an examination of practical rationality related to an Aristotelian model of a practical syllogism would be applicable to the O’Neill’s claim that universal principles of action must be the focus of practical reasoning (O’NEILL, 1996, p.66-90). In this sense, the universal principles of action can be considered as major premises of practical syllogisms.



## 2. The problem of relevant descriptions

We do not offer what would be a third criterion or a criterion of our own to evaluate the Aristotelian and the Kantian approaches because, as we said before, what we try to do is not a contrast between a deontological ethics and a virtue one. What we will try to do is a comparison which highlights their respective positive points in terms of practical rationality for poverty mitigation policies.

We think that a first general and strong point of those two approaches is that they both seem to offer positive responses to the problem of relevant descriptions. Certain contemporary philosophy of action is concerned with the conditions of possibility for normative statements in Ethics. In this respect, one of the main problems discussed is that of the relevant descriptions. Therefore, our choice of one specific Aristotelian approach and of one specific Kantian approach is justified because they both seem to accommodate responses to the demands of the problem of relevant descriptions.

Onora O'Neill is methodologically attentive to the description of the deliberation and the action, but she recognizes the difficulty that occurs when a problem is put by a descriptive analysis of the action:

“The problem could be put as follows: obligations to do or omit actions of various sorts are individuated by act descriptions. (...) Obligations are met when those who hold them act and forbear in ways specified by certain descriptions. Since descriptions are indeterminate, no obligation wholly specifies the ways in which it may be fulfilled. (...) If the vocabulary of action of different contexts varies greatly, how can there be universal or even widespread obligations? (O'NEILL, 1986, p.123)

In an article about the problem of relevant descriptions, Onora O'Neill says this issue had been pointed out mainly by Elizabeth Anscombe as a central source of the alleged failure of modern moral philosophy<sup>2</sup>. After all, if an action as an act-token can fall under several true descriptions, this instance can also fall under several possible principles of action (O'NEILL, 2018, p.15). Before we dwell on the issue of the Aristotelian and the Kantian proposals, we present what would be the difficulty of a consequentialist approach to deal with the challenge of the relevant descriptions. We think that a critique of such an approach can clarify us about the strong points of the two approaches that we will discuss later.

The problem of the relevant descriptions could compromise an imposition of practical universal demands for an ethics, thus generating a framework of relativism to the context in which an action occurs. O'Neill herself asks: “Where perceptions of action diverge radically, how can there be generally accessible reasoning about obligations? Is not such reasoning as unavoidably tied to local context as is accessible reasoning about results?” (O'NEILL, 1986, p.124).

According to O'Neill, a consequentialist theory could be a response to the framework suggested by moral skepticism, in which it would be rejected: all moral rules, all conceptions of obligation or duty and all claims about rights that are not merely legal positive rights. In this sense, the fundamental category for consequentialists would be some conception of good, based on the maximization of good consequences. However, the global tackling against poverty is a high practical demand and, according to O'Neill, the consequentialist position is the most demanding one from the agency's point of view, and possibly even more demanding for agents than those positions that ostensibly emphasize rules, duties and rights (O'NEILL, 2009).

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<sup>2</sup> In the article “Modern Moral Philosophy” Elizabeth Anscombe defends that investigations in Moral Philosophy must be banned until we have a consideration of what a human action would be and how the description of its operation would be affected by its intention (ANSCOMBE, 1981, p.29).



O'Neill's consideration of a consequentialist approach is based on Peter Singer's influential position on the issue of global poverty mitigation. The high demand of the consequentialist position is found in Singer's argument that for tackling poverty those who live comfortably owe much more to the poor than what had been widely assumed. In the influential article "Famine, Affluence and Morality", the author argues that the omission of the people who live in rich countries is not morally justified and that both their conceptual schemes and their ways of life must be changed (SINGER, 1972, p.230).

However, according to O'Neill, the fundamental claims of consequentialist maximization would be flawed, not because they would be too demanding, but because - from a practical point of view - they would not be able to guide action, thus failing to provide a basis for an ethical position with practical implications. In relation to the reasoning aspect which provides guidance for action, agents of consequentialist position would have to make unfeasible calculations, such as calculating all the expected consequences - but even if those calculations were feasible, a consistent parameter would still be missing to assess the calculation itself (O'NEILL, 2009). As previously stated, it is necessary for O'Neill's criticism a requirement to guide the type of actions that would promote poverty mitigation, and that criticism could be expressed in examining or reviewing morally pre-established parameters.

### **3. An Aristotelian approach to poverty mitigation policies**

In a book published in 2016, "Ethics in the conflicts of Modernity: An essay on Desire, Practical Reasoning", Alasdair MacIntyre presents a critic of the deliberative aspect of the consequentialist position. Before we present that, we will expose some points concerning the way in which the author conceives practical rationality as a justification for action in the political sphere, specifically with respect to the mitigation of poverty. The following presentation from what we call an Aristotelian point of view in MacIntyre will allow us to compare the perspective of the virtues with the perspective of the obligations of Onora O'Neill in an epistemic framework also attentive to the analysis of deliberation and action. After exposing that, we will analyze how Onora O'Neill - with Kantian inspiration - offers her theoretical perspective of guidance for poverty mitigation policies.

According to MacIntyre the practical rationality of a consequentialist position can be described in concepts related to the dominant economic order in which the maximization of good consequences is foreseen if there is mutual satisfaction between agents in negotiation and if their preferences are mutually and maximally fulfilled. In this context, decision-making procedures are those that can be described from typical questions of contemporary economic theories, such as Decision Theory and Game Theory. "What is the best strategy to adopt given that other players will adopt their best strategies?" is an example of a typical question of those theories that often rises as a question of practical rationality in agents and agencies familiarized with the economic paradigms of the actual economic order (MACINTYRE, 2016, p. 186). However, when the problem of the poverty is considered, a practical rationality based on prevailing economic paradigms would be inadequate, because its conclusions take into account the exchange of advantages that certain people could not offer: after all, an agent can be useful and helpful before anyone that has wealth, power and influence to satisfy her preferences, but how would she benefit from those who suffer from deep destitution? (MACINTYRE, 2016, p.187)

MacIntyre recalls that in the period from 1990 to 2010 there had been a significant decrease in poverty in the world, in which the proportion of the populations of the poorest countries that lived in extreme poverty declined by 43%. However, even if the reduction of poverty had as one of its main causes the economic growth of developing markets, it is something that rational maximizers have reason to promote only insofar as the good consequences are compatible with what is required to promote their own interests. Then MacIntyre states:

“Think now on the one hand of the plight of those populations, whether in developing or in advanced economies, who lose out in the competition to benefit from investment and who have no other remedy for their poverty, and on the other of the considerations relevant to rational investors attempting to maximize the return on their investment. The latter have no reason at all to take account of, let alone to take responsibility for, the former (MACINTYRE, 2016, p.187).

Furthermore, MacIntyre relates the practical rationality of the current economic order as a guide for policies that cause inequalities, thus blocking the very mitigation of poverty. Agents engaged in marketing transactions need a wide and complex institutional structure, at national and international levels, that enable business to be conducted. However, in a perspective in which the practical rationality of maximizers is involved, market agents will try to reduce their expenses and maximize, as much as possible and through political engagement, the participation of public expenditures in the financing of favorable business environments. Therefore, MacIntyre claims: “Growing inequality in outcomes is not an accidental feature of any society in which those with money and power are rational maximizers, even when those maximizers are constrained maximizers” (MACINTYRE, 2016, p.188).

Given the practical rationality of the maximizers, moral rules for poverty mitigation are viewed with suspicion by MacIntyre. This is explained because the morality, in MacIntyre’s conception, is also expressed in function of the current practical rationality; therefore, poverty mitigation would be something to be faced from a philanthropic point of view by the generators of inequalities themselves. Thus, according to the author, obedience to morals is what allows Western governments to make, for example, those promises of aid that in future cost-benefit analyzes are usually broken (MACINTYRE, 2016, p.188).

MacIntyre considers that Morality and institutions of state and market shape social relations directly and indirectly, insofar as people’s practical rationality is widely informed by the ethics of the State, the Market and the rules of Morality (MACINTYRE, 2016, p.188, p.166-167). As a counterpoint to a predominant practical rationality in capitalist societies, MacIntyre suggests the advantage from the neoristotelian point of view regarding practical rationality.

In such an approach, which involves a syllogistic perspective, answers to the question “Why did you act in such a way?” are the premises, while the conclusion of them is the action itself. From this syllogistic perspective, presented by Aristotle in *De Anima* (434a16-21), in which rationalization results in action, MacIntyre states that the character of the agent and the nature of its practical rationality determine the type of action carried out. In turn, the agent’s ability to distinguish genuine goods from apparent goods in the deliberative process is a matter that depends on her moral and intellectual qualities, that is, on her vices and virtues. Therefore, virtues are qualities that enable agents to evaluate and order goods that are at stake in a particular situation - and to be rationally practical is to know how to evaluate and order goods (MACINTYRE, 2016, p.188, p.189-190).

In terms of poverty mitigation, the author mentions the changes that had enabled urbanization and development in education, health and basic sanitation in the Monte Azul *Favela*, in the beginning of the 21st century, in the city of São Paulo as a good practice of rational agency. By contextualizing São Paulo as a model of city in which the impressive economic growth resulted in inequalities typical of capitalism (wealth for the few, moderate prosperity for so many others and huge areas of gross poverty for the excluded), MacIntyre seeks to show that the development of Monte Azul, instead of had being brought about by agents who had rationalized through competitive advantages, it was driven by cooperative activities that had involved the evaluation of common goods and the means necessary to achieve them:

“Particular working groups and more general groups have met regularly for deliberate discussion on how to define and achieve the common goods with which they are concerned, on how to obtain the resources needed for their struggles, and how to mobilize political support, embarrassing national and municipal governments and elites that claim to be concerned for the poor, but who are strikingly unresponsive to the poor who do not organize politically” (MACINTYRE, 2016, p.181).



Since the 1970's the Monte Azul Community Association have been promoting community efforts and mobilizations within the public power that had lead to advances in urbanization and housing conditions, with the provision of water and electric energy services, sewage canalization and the installation of health, education, assistance and leisure services. According to MacIntyre, the activities of the Monte Azul Community Association that had enabled local development are explained in terms of virtues, such as political prudence, justice, courage and temperance, and adds that there are numerous world examples of groups that have had achieved goods relevant to their communities through practical rationalization that escapes the economicist paradigm which is the moral order in force in Western nations (MACINTYRE, 2016, p.181-182).

It is true that policies for poverty mitigations whose agents are virtuous individuals - such as a courageous president of an association, or a prudent financial planner which is responsible for contracting services for the installment of a local school or a local hospital, or a religious leader with a sense of justice, whose efforts to raise funds to the poor neighbors of her parish is more oriented to the richer ones – might be explained in terms of a non-utilitarian practical rationality, but the very efficiency of those policies conducted by some virtuous agents is locally observed, and not efficient for the eradication of the causes that produce inequalities and poverty. As we will see next a “Kantian” approach has the positive point of being more universally demanding than the “Aristotelian” approach.

#### **4. A Kantian approach to poverty mitigation policies**

Practical rationality plays also an important role in Onora O’Neill’s ethical project. She constantly argues that ethics needs not only convincing starting points, but convincing ways of proceeding from those starting points. Also in O’Neill’s project, ethical judgment is not based on the discovery of ethical characteristics about the world, but on the construction of ethical principles, which have to meet universalizing requirements of justice and be accessible.

In seeking to respond to the impasse of modern moral philosophy as presented by Elizabeth Anscombe, Onora O’Neill adopts the strategy of focusing her analysis on practical epistemic aspects, instead of emphasizing the practical aspect of action through a theory of virtues. Beyond methodological issues, a central point for Onora O’Neill concerns the primacy of the obligation over rights. Kant’s conceptions of obligation are taken into account by O’Neill in her outlining of a starting point for deliberation and for action that would lead to a less unfair international economic and political order. She seeks to defend the thesis that a theory of obligation that can guide action must provide “moves” in which there would have been transitions from abstract descriptions to more specific descriptions of problems and obligations of particular agents in a certain context of action (O’NEILL, 1986, p.124)

O’Neill’s practical emphasis on the analysis of the deliberative stage seeks to dissolve the obstacles of moral skepticism. Practical judgments, which includes ethical judgment, are not oriented to action-tokens, so the problem of indeterminacy of descriptions would not apply. After all practical deliberations guide the action, instead of judging actions that had already been taken (O’NEILL, 2004, p. 22). Besides, according to O’Neill to confuse appreciation of particular situations with practical judgments is to take a spectator view of moral life (O’NEILL, 2004, p.24).

In overcoming the possibility of moral skepticism, O’Neill defends a theory of obligation that comes to provide a critical method for determining what are the relevant problems, whose problems are these and what actions are available. She points out that only if we have a critical consideration of deliberation, namely, of the specificatory reasoning by which a moral agenda can be established, debated and revised,

will ethical reasoning avoid echoing local considerations of problems, responsible people and applications (O'NEILL, 1986, p.125).

As we have noted earlier, a theory of virtue, like that of MacIntyre, also predicts the relevance of a practical rationality that criticizes the conditions for action established by current morality. But while MacIntyre's conception of practical rationality starts from an Aristotelian conception of the agent's moral and intellectual qualities that determine virtue or vice, O'Neill adopts the Kantian epistemic perspective in which practical rationality – as we will present - is explained by universal principles of obligation.

O'Neill makes use of the Kantian distinction between determinant judgment (judgment that subsumes the particular to the universal) and reflective judgment (judgment that seeks to find the universal in the particular). This distinction is philosophically important because in all reasoning about action, agents and agencies have to judge (determinantly) what is necessary to act according to certain principles and have to judge (reflexively) on which principles and descriptions certain problems, acts or policies are being exemplified. According to O'Neill, when it comes to establishing policies to mitigate poverty, the beginning of the answer to a question such as: "What constitutes charitable action for the poor and hungry?" starts from standardized and reputable examples, since agents and agencies are not ideal deliberators. However, an approach that takes into account the role of reflective and determinant judgments does not limit itself to pre-established ethical perspectives (O'NEILL, 1986, p.126-128).

Practical deliberations may take as a starting point virtuous located examples: the case of the Monte Azul Favela cited by MacIntyre could be a starting point for a political decision making process elsewhere. However, if we understand - as MacIntyre himself suggests - that the causes of inequalities and processes of exclusion also involve agents and agencies that operate internationally according to moral economic standards, some deliberations about actions of mitigating poverty must also be carried out in a global perspective in which universal principles would have to be applied.

It seems that a theory of virtue offers accessibility, criticism and provides orientation for action through a conception of practical rationality based on virtue. However, when a global problem is concerned, Onora O'Neill's Kantian inspired approach is attentive to the fulfillment of the requirement of universality. According to O'Neill, Kant is a unique model of provision for a theory of universal obligation:

“... nobody travelled further towards a universal theory of obligation than Kant. Even if he did not provide a map for the whole journey, he charted large stretches of it. His map may point us towards a theory of obligation which is generally accessible, yet is neither so vague and 'thin' it cannot guide action or so bound to locally established categories of thought that it cannot criticize them. From the frontier it may be possible to see the outlines of further terrain that must be charted if the boundaries of reasoning about world hunger and poverty are to be pushed back by modes of deliberation that are generally accessible yet action-guiding. (O'NEILL, 1986, p.131)”

In Kant the relatively abstract principles of obligation can be divided into two groups that demand universality: principles for determining perfect duties (which include justice) and principles for determining imperfect duties (which include beneficence). The universal obligation not to act unjustly according to maxims (principles of action) of non-deception and non-coercion is the perfect duty. But it is worth mentioning that what imperfect duties are constituted of are also obligations, and are also universal: namely the obligation of respect, help and the development of capacities. Therefore, the Kantian ethics in the reading of Onora O'Neill - which foresees obligations of justice, beneficence and development – seems to emerge as a reasonable possibility for the direction of actions focused on poverty mitigation (O'NEILL, 1986, p.144-146).

Even though in an unjust and needy world there is more scope for respect and the necessity of helping the poor - which implies the fulfillment of imperfect duties - no aid activity or promotion of talents could

provide institutional conditions that would guarantee absence of coercion and deception. It is an important emphasis on O'Neill's Kantian approach that imperfect obligations are also obligations, but she points out that neither respect nor the provision of skills can replace justice. According to her, the present economic and international order is unjust because it normalizes and often institutionalizes coercion and deception. In addition, that order fails in respecting and fostering the development of the skills necessary for human lives to include autonomous actions. In contrast to that, a just global order should be incorporated into economic and political structures that would do not institutionalize either coercion or deception, thus respecting rationality and autonomy. However, O'Neil admits that since institutional structures are far from just, imperfect duties can often be the only and incomplete answers to human needs (O'NEILL, 1986, p.144-163).

The urgency of promoting imperfect duties implies necessarily in targeting beneficiaries. Beneficence cannot be expressed in a policy of meeting all the needs and the development of all talents. So how could selective beneficence or selective development be justified in a Kantian approach? O'Neill's answer assumes that the issue is indeed a problem when a utilitarian or rights-based approach is at stake. When utilitarians consider beneficence as a complete social virtue, they are unable to avoid the suggestion that selectivity drives ethical concern locally and makes it impossible its adequacy to deliberations on global problems. In turn, rights theorists treat selective beneficence in a supererogatory perspective and not as an obligation for everyone. A Kantian consideration of beneficence would avoid these dilemmas because it considers beneficence as an obligation - even though beneficence is not a central part of a theory of obligation (O'NEILL, 1986, p.159-161).

Finally, when O'Neill considers the relation between justice, beneficence and policy formulations she concludes that there is no incompatibility between beneficent activity and political activity, when there is the same objective of mitigating hunger and poverty. But the meeting of basic human needs cannot reject the political objective that seeks more just institutional situations. O'Neill says that justice is not (as suggested by utilitarians) the most important aspect of beneficence - justice is more fundamental. In this way, a serious commitment to charity and beneficent action requires a commitment to material justice and political change (O'NEILL, 1986, p.162-163).

## **5. Final considerations**

Although the purpose of this article was focused on the attempt to present a comparison between the perspectives that we call Aristotelian (1) and Kantian (2) in Alasdair MacIntyre and Onora O'Neill which presents some differences in their respective scopes, we suggest that they do not necessarily contradict each other. There is a risk of oversimplification, but we could consider those perspectives respectively as "contextually efficient" (1) and "universally demanding" (2). Although we do not see contradiction, it seems that, on the other hand, a compatibility between these two perspectives would be more efficient in regionalized practical challenges than in global practical challenges.

There is a project attentive to the compatibility between concrete human experience and universal requisites in Martha Nussbaum's attempt to think about Amartya Sen's capabilities approach and its relation with human development without neglecting contextual focus. Although Nussbaum is critical of a supposedly wide and problematic generality of Kant's universal principles, she understands that a universal approach to respect coupled with a contextualized consideration of local problems is able to provide good results. Nussbaum mentions the human development observed in rural areas of Bangladesh - which had benefited several women at the end of the last century - from government efforts that had combined generalizing beliefs about education, autonomy and respect, with tactics attentive to local behaviors (NUSSBAUM, 1993, p.242-269). In fact, practical rationalizations based on making universal principles compatible with particular issues can be epistemically mobilized to explain the successful case exemplified by Nussbaum.





But cases like that of Bangladesh, or the one that we have mentioned earlier of Monte Azul in São Paulo are still empirically regionalized, so that a compatibility of approaches would bring difficulties if we were to require empirical results for an approach that should be “globally efficient” (instead of “contextually efficient”) and “universally demanding”. Nowadays there is still no resolution in sight for the problem of world hunger and extreme poverty. In the present context of exponential technical-scientific development, practical deliberations for global poverty mitigation are highly accessible and desirable, but we ultimately follow Onora O’Neill’s Kantian position: that we are obliged to undertake such deliberations is a question of obligation first.

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