

## The Human Soul as *Hoc Aliquid* and as *Substance* in Thomas Aquinas<sup>1</sup>

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**Abstract:** Thomas Aquinas defines the human soul with the same words of Aristotle: it is *the substantial form of a human body potentially alive*. However, one of the problems of the Thomistic psychology, according to D. Abel, consists in classifying the human soul by means of terms that are commonly used to name hylomorphic compounds, namely, *substance* and *hoc aliquid*. If the human soul is part of a hylomorphic compound, how could it be named as *substance* and *hoc aliquid*? The aim of this paper is to show the strategy that underlies this classification used by Aquinas. We suggest that it dates back to Aristotle when he attributes different meanings to the words *substance* and *hoc aliquid*. Aquinas' novelty consists in expanding this semantic field by introducing a meaning that refers exclusively to the human soul, that is, *the peculiar sense*.

**Keywords:** Human Soul, Substantial Form, *Hoc Aliquid*, Substance, Thomas Aquinas, Aristotle.

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## 1. Introduction<sup>2</sup>

The definition of the human soul found in Thomas Aquinas' writings is the one we somehow have already found in the Aristotelian works: *the human soul is the substantial form of the potentially alive human body*, that is, it is the principle of the actualization of the body, being responsible for the emergence of a substance in act belonging to the human species (see ARISTOTLE, 2017, *De Anima*, II, 1, 412a19-21, p. 71-72 [Aristotle, 1995b, p. 1438]; THOMAS AQUINAS, 1951, *In De Anima*, II, lect. 1, §221 [S. Thomae de Aquino, 1984, vol. XLV.1, l. 216-223, p. 70]; *Id.*, 2015, *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 75, art. 1, p. 355-357 [S. Thomae de Aquino, 1889, vol. V, p. 194-195]; *Ibid.*, *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 76, art. 1, p. 372-378 [S. Thomae de Aquino, 1889, vol. V, p. 208-210]). Nonetheless, the Thomistic psychology presents several obscure elements. Among them, the classification of the human soul as a *substance* and a *hoc aliquid* stands out (see THOMAS AQUINAS, 1951, *In De Anima*, II, lect. 1, §215 [S. Thomae de Aquino, 1984, vol. XLV.1, l. 96-113, p. 69]; *Id.*, 2015, *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 75, art. 2, ad 1, p. 359 [S. Thomae de Aquino, 1889, vol. V, p. 196]; *Id.*, 2012, *Q. de Anima*, q. 1, p. 33-51 [S. Thomae de Aquino, 1968, p. 54-63]; *Id.*, 1949, *De spirit. creat.*, q. 2, ad 16 [S. Thomae de Aquino, 1953a, §64069]).

On the one hand, the term *substance* especially refers to the hylomorphic compounds. Thus, a dog, a stone, and a rose are said to be *substances*, but the sensitive soul of the dog, the substantial form of the stone, and the vegetative soul of the rose are not designated in this manner. The term *hoc aliquid*, on the other hand, is the Latin version of the Aristotelian expression *tóde ti* and has several translations, such as: *this something*, *something determinate*, *something*, *a certain this*, *something designated*, or *this*. Usually, *hoc aliquid* is used by Aristotle and Aquinas as a classification of compounds, but not of its parts. By the same token, a dog, a stone, and a rose are called *hoc aliquid*, but the sensitive soul of the dog, the substantial form of the stone, and the vegetative soul of the rose are not designated like that.

That said, once the human soul is part of a compound, how could it, then, be called a *substance* and a *hoc aliquid*? Would it not lead to the conception that the human soul would have the same ontological status of a compound and not the status of a substantial form anymore?<sup>3</sup> Aquinas' answer is ingenious. Let's see:

"This something" [*hoc aliquid*] can be taken in two senses. Firstly, for anything subsistent; secondly, for that which subsists, and is complete in a specific nature. The former sense excludes the inherence of an accident or of a material form; the latter excludes also the imperfection of the part, so that a hand can be called "this something" in the

<sup>2</sup> We will make use of the following abbreviations for Aquinas' works: 1. *In Sent.* (*Commentary on the Sentences*); 2. *In De Anima* (*Commentary on Aristotle's De Anima*); 3. *In De Causis* (*Commentary on the Book of Causes*); 4. *In Metaphys.* (*Commentary on the Metaphysics*); 5. *De ente* (*On Being and Essence*); 6. *De spirit. creat.* (*Disputed Questions on Spiritual Creatures*); 7. *Q. de Anima* (*Disputed Questions on the Soul*); 8. *De Pot.* (*Disputed Questions on the Power of God*); 9. *Cont. Gent.* (*Summa Against the Gentiles*); 10. *Summa Theol.* (*Summa Theologica*). Aquinas' Latin quotations will be referenced according to the Latin editions indicated in the bibliographical list, whereas the English quotations will follow the indicated English translations. Aquinas' indirect quotations will follow the translations indicated in the bibliographical list and be accompanied, in square brackets, by references to the Latin editions. Aristotle's English quotations will be referenced according to the English translations indicated in the bibliographical list, whereas the indirect quotations will follow the Portuguese translations indicated in the bibliographical list and be accompanied, in square brackets, by references to the English translations.

<sup>3</sup> S. THOMAE DE AQUINO, 1888, vol. IV, *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 29, art. 2, p. 330: "Alio modo dicitur substantia subiectum vel suppositum quod subsistit in genere substantiae. Et hoc quidem, communiter accipiendo, nominari potest et nomine significante intentionem, et sic dicitur suppositum. Nominatur etiam tribus nominibus significantibus rem, quae quidem sunt res naturae, subsistentia et hypostasis, secundum triplicem considerationem substantiae sic dictae. Secundum enim quod per se existit et non in alio, vocatur subsistentia, illa enim subsistere dicimus, quae non in alio, sed in se existunt. Secundum vero quod supponitur alicui naturae communi, sic dicitur res naturae; sicut hic homo est res naturae humanae. Secundum vero quod supponitur accidentibus, dicitur hypostasis vel substantia. Quod autem haec tria nomina significant communiter in toto genere substantiarum, hoc nomen persona significat in genere rationalium substantiarum." *Id.*, 1889, vol. V, *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 75, art. 2, arg. 1, p. 196: "Videtur quod anima humana non sit aliquid subsistens. Quod enim est subsistens, dicitur hoc aliquid. Anima autem non est hoc aliquid, sed compositum ex anima et corpore. Ergo anima non est aliquid subsistens."

first sense, but not in the second. Therefore, as the human soul is a part of human nature, it can indeed be called “this something” [*hoc aliquid*], in the first sense, as being something subsistent; but not in the second, for in this sense, what is composed of body and soul is said to be “this something” [*hoc aliquid*]. (THOMAS AQUINAS, 1981, *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 75, art. 2, ad 1, p. 483, modified).<sup>4</sup>

In this passage, Aquinas firstly assigns two meanings to the term *hoc aliquid*, which are: (a) *that which subsists in/by itself and is not complete in a certain species*; (b) *that which subsists in/by itself and is complete in a certain species*. Later on, he states that the hylomorphic compounds meet the (b) meaning, whereas the human souls meet the (a) meaning. Therefore, Aquinas concludes that the human soul is denominated as *hoc aliquid* for being subsistent in/by itself, not for having an ontological status similar to a compound.

Notwithstanding, this answer does not seem to be fully convincing. Would it not mean a subversion of the original meaning (that is, the Aristotelian) of *substance* and of *hoc aliquid*? For D. Abel, in Aristotle, *hoc aliquid* had only the (b) meaning. Thus, such term would only be assigned to the compounds (ABEL, 1995, pp. 229-234). In addition, according to the Aristotelian metaphysics, a thing could only be classified as *substance* once it operates by itself and also, according to the Thomistic metaphysics, once it does not share its act of being with another thing. However, the human soul needs the senses in order to perform the intellectual activity and, besides that, it communicates the act of being to the body and, in ultimate analysis, to the compound itself (see THOMAS AQUINAS, 2015, *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 75, art. 2, ad 3, p. 360 [S. Thomae de Aquino, 1889, vol. V, p. 197]; *Ibid.*, *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 76, art. 5, p. 391-394 [S. Thomae de Aquino, 1889, vol. V, p. 227-228]; *Id.*, 1990, *Cont. Gent.*, II, c. 43, §1196, p. 236-237 [S. Thomae de Aquino, 1918, vol. XIII, p. 367]; c. 54, §1290-1292, p. 256 [S. Thomae de Aquino, 1918, vol. XIII, p. 392]). The author, therefore, concludes that it is problematic to classify the human soul as *substance* and as *hoc aliquid* because it weakens the Aristotelian conception of *substance* and *hoc aliquid*.

The aim of this article is not to present a detailed discussion of the *hoc aliquid* issue and its relation to the doctrine of substance in Aristotle and Aquinas.<sup>5</sup> If we only take Aristotle into consideration, by way of illustration, we notice that *being a substance* includes five properties, which are: (a) being a substrate of inherence and of predication of the other Aristotelian categories; (b) being subsistent in/by itself; (c) being something determinate (*hoc aliquid* or *tóde ti*); (d) possessing intrinsic unity; and (e) being act or actuality (REALE, 2014a, p. 98). On the contrary, our purpose is to criticize Abel in his own ground, agreeing with him that there is a synonymy between *hoc aliquid* and *substance* in Aristotle and Aquinas (which, in fact, has textual support)<sup>6</sup>, in order to show, *against* him, that the Thomistic strategy to explain the terms *substance* and *hoc aliquid* as polysemic dates back to Aristotle. In order to do that, this article will be divided in two parts: in the first one, we will investigate the meaning of *substance* and of *hoc aliquid* in Aristotle; in the second one, we will investigate the meaning of *substance* and of *hoc aliquid* in Thomas Aquinas.

<sup>4</sup> S. THOMAE DE AQUINO, 1889, vol. V, *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 75, art. 2, ad 1, p. 196: “[...] dicendum quod hoc aliquid potest accipi dupliciter, uno modo, pro quocumque subsistente, alio modo, pro subsistente completo in natura alicuius speciei. Primo modo, excludit inhaerentiam accidentis et formae materialis, secundo modo, excludit etiam imperfectionem partis. Unde manus posset dici hoc aliquid primo modo, sed non secundo modo. Sic igitur, cum anima humana sit pars speciei humanae, potest dici hoc aliquid primo modo, quasi subsistens, sed non secundo modo, sic enim compositum ex anima et corpore dicitur hoc aliquid.”

<sup>5</sup> For a deeper understanding of the topic, see BOSTOCK, 2003, pp. 83-85; SMITH, 1921 [2005]; ANGIONI, 2000, p. 120-121, footnote 67; *Id.*, 2005, p. 153-154; IRWIN, 1997, p. 400-401; REALE, 2014a, p. 87-109; *Id.*, 2014b, p. 241-242; GALLUZZO, 2007; *Id.*, 2009; *Id.*, 2014.

<sup>6</sup> See ARISTOTLE, 2015, *Metaphysics*, VII, 1, 1028a10-31, p. 287-289 [Aristotle, 2003, p. 1]; THOMAS AQUINAS, 1961, *In Metaphys.*, VII, lect. 1, §1247 [S. Thomae de Aquino, 1964, p. 316]. Such synonymy is seen, for example, in ABEL, 1995, p. 231/p. 235, footnote 39. It is also defended in BAZÁN, 1997, p. 98.



## 2. *Hoc Aliquid* and Substance in Aristotle

Let us start our investigation with an analysis of the *Categories*, a work dedicated to the types of predication. In this work, Aristotle understands that there are two kinds of substances. On the one hand, there are the *first substances*, which are the individuals and the subjects of inherence of the essential and accidental properties. On the other hand, there are the *second substances*, which are the genera and the species, that is, the universal properties assigned to several first substances. For example, *a* horse and *a* man are first substances because they refer to an individual, whereas *horse* and *man* are second substances because they refer to many individuals. Aristotle states that the individuals are the items that can be properly called *substance*, whereas the genus and the species are so called in a secondary manner. Likewise, *hoc aliquid* is properly assigned to the first substances because they are singular and numerically one, and improperly to the second substances because they are attributes said of many things. Therefore, *substance* and *hoc aliquid* have, in this work, a proper meaning assigned to individuals, and a derived meaning assigned to genera and species.<sup>7</sup>

In the *Metaphysics*, in turn, Aristotle analyses the first substance in order to find out the principle of its substantiality. For this purpose, he understands the first substance as a hylomorphic compound, that is, as a composition of substantial form and matter deprived of formal determination. The term *substance* and *hoc aliquid*, in their turn, are used with different meanings for these parts and for the compound itself. *Matter* is *substance* and *hoc aliquid* in improper sense, for it (a) is the substrate of inherence of the substantial form and of the changes that occur between opposites; (b) it acquires actuality, subsistence in/by itself, unity, and generical and specific determination thanks to the substantial form; (c) it is *substance* and *hoc aliquid* in potency. The *substantial form*, in turn, is *substance* and *hoc aliquid* because (a) it is a kind of substrate, once matter depends on it; (b) it has autonomy in relation to matter, once it can be known without the matter with which it is united; (c) it is the principle of the determination of matter, that is, the principle through which matter becomes a substance of determinate species; (d) it is the principle of unity of matter and compound; (e) it is the principle of the actualization of the compound. The compound, at last, is *substance* and *hoc aliquid* because (a) it is the ultimate substrate of the accidental and essential predicates, (b) it has autonomy in relation to other compounds; (c) it is an individual belonging to a determinate

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<sup>7</sup> ARISTOTLE, 2002, *Categories*, 2a11-14, p. 6: "A *substance* – that which is called a substance more strictly, primarily, and most of all – is that which is neither said of a subject nor in a subject, e. g. the individual man or the individual horse. The species in which the things primarily called substances are, are called *secondary substances*, as also are the genera of these species. For example, the individual man belongs in a species, man, and animal is a genus of the species; so these – both man and animal – are called secondary substances." *Ibid.*, *Categories*, 3b10-18, p. 9: "Every substance seems to signify a certain 'this'. As regards the primary substances, it is indisputably true that each of them signifies a certain 'this'; for the thing revealed is individual and numerically one. But as regards the secondary substances, though it appears from the form of the name – when one speaks of a man or animal – that a secondary substance likewise signifies a certain 'this', this is not necessarily true; rather, it signifies a certain qualification, for the subject is not, as the primary substance is, one, but man and animal are said of many things."

genus and species; (d) it is a single thing thanks to the substantial form that gathers the material parts; (e) it is act because its material parts are actualized by the substantial form.<sup>8</sup>

As can be seen, the *Metaphysics* presents a substantial form as the principle of substantiality of the compound. However, it is not clear whether the *Metaphysics* contradicts the *Categories* by defending that the substantial form is primarily *substance* and *hoc aliquid*, or whether it maintains the position of the *Categories* by defending that the compound is the main referent of these terms. In this regard, G. Galluzzo presents two possible approaches (GALLUZZO, 2007, pp. 438-440/pp. 444-445):

1. *Incompatibilistic Approach*: defends the discontinuity between the *Categories* and the *Metaphysics*. In the first work, the main meaning of *substance* and of *hoc aliquid* would be of *individual*, referring to the compound. In the second work, the main meaning would be of *principle of substantiality of the compound*, referring to the substantial form;<sup>9</sup>
2. *Compatibilistic Approach*: defends the continuity between the *Categories* and the *Metaphysics*. In both works, the main meaning would be of *individual*, referring to the compound. The role of the substantial form as principle of substantiality would not turn it into a primarily *substance* and *hoc aliquid*.<sup>10</sup>

<sup>8</sup> ARISTOTLE, 2003, *Metaphysics*, VII, 3, 1029a28-30, p. 3-4: "If, then, we proceed on this basis, matter turns out to be a substance. But this is impossible, for separability and thisness seem to belong chiefly to substance; and for this reason the form and the compound would seem to be substance more than matter is." *Ibid.*, *Metaphysics*, VII, 11, 1037a22-23, p. 21: "For we have said that the formula of the substance will not contain those parts that are parts as matter – which indeed are not parts of *that* substance at all, but of the substance which is the combined whole. And this latter in a way does not have a formula, though in another way it does; when taken together with its matter it does not have a formula, since matter is indeterminate, but it does not have a formula in accordance with its primary substance. (Thus a man has the formula of the soul.) For the substance is the form that is in the thing, and the whole combined from this and the matter is called a substance from this. Thus concavity is the substance, and from this and the nose there is formed a snub nose and snubness [for in these the nose will occur twice]. But the substance which is the combined whole, e.g. a snub nose or Callias, has matter in it as well." *Ibid.*, *Metaphysics*, VIII, 1, 1042a24-32, p. 32: "What underlies is a substance, and in one way this is the matter (by which I mean that which is not a this [*hoc aliquid*] in actuality, but is a this [*hoc aliquid*] potentially), though in another way it is the formula and the shape (which is a this [*hoc aliquid*] and is separable in formula), and in a third way it is what is compounded from these (and this alone can come to be and cease to be, and is separable without qualification – for of those substances which are given by a formula some are separable and some are not)." *Id.*, 1995a, *Metaphysics*, XII, 3, 1070a12-13, p. 3633: "There are three kinds of substance—the matter, which is a 'this' [*hoc aliquid*] by being perceived (for all things that are characterized by contact and not by organic unity are matter and substratum); the nature, a 'this' [*hoc aliquid*] and a state that it moves towards; and again, thirdly, the particular substance which is composed of these two, e.g. Socrates or Callias." The same position is found in *Id.*, 2017, *De Anima*, II, 1, 412a6-9, p. 71 [Aristotle, 1995b, p. 1437]. Apparently, *Metaphysics* VIII, 1 makes the use of the term *hoc aliquid* in the same sense as it is used for matter, the form, and the compound. However, we suggest another possible interpretation for this text. Aristotle seems to present the following classification in *Metaphysics* VIII, 1: (a) *substance* would mean *substrate or matter* because matter would be *hoc aliquid* in potency; (b) *substance* would mean *essence or form* because the substantial form would be *hoc aliquid* in the sense of *being separable by thought*; (c) *substance* would mean *compound* because the compound would be *hoc aliquid* in the sense of *being separable in proper sense*. Thus, *Metaphysics* VIII, 1 seems to suggest that the term *substance* would have three senses, which are: *substrate or matter*, *essence or form* and *compound*. Furthermore, he seems to suggest that the term *hoc aliquid* would be related to the notion of separability and would have three senses, which are: *that which is separable in potency* (corresponding to the term *substance* in the sense of *substrate and matter*), *that which is separable by thought* (corresponding to the term *substance* in the sense of *essence or form*), *that which is separable in proper sense* (corresponding to the term *substance* in the sense of *compound*). Thus, although it is not our aim to present a deep analysis of the Aristotelian texts, the text of the *Metaphysics* VIII can be legitimately interpreted in a way that corroborates different senses for the terms *substance* and *hoc aliquid*.

<sup>9</sup> Such approach is defended in REALE, 2014a, pp. 101-103; *Id.*, 2015, pp. 364-365 and seems to be supported in ARISTOTLE, 2015, *Metaphysics*, VII, 17, 1041a9-10, p. 361 [Aristotle, 2003, p. 29]; *Ibid.*, *Metaphysics*, VII, 17, 1041b5-10, p. 363 [Aristotle, 2003, p. 30].

<sup>10</sup> Such approach is defended in LOUX, 2008, pp. 154-156 (especially footnote 58) and seems to be supported in ARISTOTLE, 2015, *Metaphysics*, VII, 3, 1029a28-30, p. 293-295 [Aristotle, 2003, p. 3-4].





This brief exposition shows that Aristotle deals with a flexible sense of *hoc aliquid* and of *substance* that can be attributed to matter, to the substantial form and to the compound: when related to matter, these terms mean *substrate of the substantial form*; when related to the substantial form, they mean *principle of substantiality of the compound*; when related to the compound, they mean *individual*.

Now, since *substance* and *hoc aliquid* have different meanings, nothing would prevent Aquinas from extending the semantic domain of these words, including a meaning that referred to the human soul. In addition, the Thomistic position could not be *a priori* in conflict with the Aristotelian conception because there is no clarity with regard to what is primarily *substance* and *hoc aliquid* in Aristotle. Therefore, Abel's criticism would be valid if Aquinas interpreted the nature of the soul in opposition to the manner with which Aquinas himself interprets the nature of substance in Aristotle. We are going to evaluate, in the second part of the article, whether this in fact occurs.

### 3. *Hoc Aliquid* and Substance in Thomas Aquinas

In the *Commentary to the Metaphysics*, Aquinas declares himself as a defender of the compatibilistic approach described above. He understands that the *Categories* and the *Metaphysics* analyze the substance under two different perspectives, preserving, however, the main sense of *substance* as *first substance*. Let's see:

Hence, he [Aristotle] concludes that it is necessary to establish the truth "about this," i.e., about this subject or first substance, because such a subject seems in the truest sense to be substance. Therefore, in the *Categories* it is said that such substance is said to be "substance" properly, principally and chiefly. For substances of this kind are by their very nature the subjects of all other things, namely, of species, genera and accidents; whereas second substance, i.e., genera and species, are the subjects of accidents alone. And they also have this nature only by reason of these first substances; for "man is white" inasmuch as this man is white. Hence it is evident that the division of substance given here is almost the same as that given in the *Categories*, for by "subject" here is understood first substance. And what he [Aristotle] called the genus and the universal, which seem to pertain to genus and species, are contained under second substances. However, the essence [*quod quid erat esse*], which is given here, is omitted in that work, because it belongs in the predicamental order only as a principle; for it is neither a genus nor a species nor an individual thing, but is the formal principle of all these things. (THOMAS AQUINAS, 1961, *In Metaphys.*, VII, lect. 2, §1274-1275, modified)<sup>11</sup>

This excerpt refers to the *Metaphysics*, VII, 3 and 4. In this part, Aristotle investigates what *substance* means and, thus, provides it with four meanings: (a) essence; (b) universal; (c) genus; (d) substrate. He gives special attention to the meanings (a) and (b) and states, in chapter 3, that *substance* means *substrate* for being "that of which other things are predicated while it itself is predicated of nothing further" (ARISTOTLE, 2003, *Metaphysics*, VII, 3, 1028b36, p. 3), and, in chapter 4, that *substance* means *essence* for being "in its own right" (ARISTOTLE, 2003, *Metaphysics*, VII, 4, 1029b16, p. 4), that is, that which belongs *per se* to something, prescindendo from its accidental properties.

<sup>11</sup> S. THOMAE DE AQUINO, 1964, *In Metaphys.*, VII, lect. 2, n. 1274-1275, p. 321: "Unde concludit quod determinandum est 'de hoc', idest de subiecto vel de substantia prima, quia tale subiectum maxime videtur substantia esse. Unde in *Praedicamentis* dicitur quod talis substantia est quae proprie et principaliter et maxime dicitur. Huiusmodi enim secundum se omnibus aliis substant, scilicet speciebus et generibus et accidentibus. Substantiae vero secundae, idest genera et species, substant solis accidentibus. Et hoc etiam non habent nisi ratione primarum. Homo enim est albus in quantum hic homo est albus. Unde patet quod fere eadem est divisio substantiae hic posita, cum illa quae ponitur in *Praedicamentis*. Nam per subiectum intelligitur hic substantia prima. Quod autem dixit genus et universale, quod videtur ad genus et species pertinere, continetur sub substantiis secundis. Hoc autem quod quid erat esse hic ponitur, sed ibi praetermittitur, quia non cadit in praedicamentorum ordine nisi sicut principium. Neque enim est genus neque species neque individuum, sed horum omnium formale principium."



In his commentary, Aquinas shows that the transition of themes that takes place in the passage from chapter 3 to chapter 4 of the *Metaphysics* reflects the transition of themes that takes place in the passage from the *Categories* to the *Metaphysics*. For him, both works are dedicated to the same material object, and he understands that the main meaning of *substance* is of *individual* and that this term refers primarily to *first substance* or *subject* (called *compound* or *sinol* in the *Metaphysics*). However, they have distinct formal objects: on the one hand, the *Categories* analyze the substance as subject of predication and, therefore, it states that *substance* primarily means *individual*; on the other hand, the *Metaphysics* investigates the *formal principle* (*formale principium*) that makes something a first substance and, thus, he dismembers the first substance in matter and substantial form, examines the function of the substantial form and investigates in what sense the substantial form can be called a *substance*. The structure of book VII of the *Metaphysics* makes that clear for Aquinas because, in chapter 3, Aristotle repeats the meaning of *substance* as *first substance* already determined by the *Categories* and, in chapter 4, he investigates the formal principle of the first substance by introducing a theme that had not been approached before.

Subsequently, Aquinas emphasizes that the terms *substance* and *hoc aliquid* are equivalently predicated to matter, to the substantial form, and to the compound as such.<sup>12</sup> In addition, he adverts that *substance* and *hoc aliquid* have three attributes in their primary senses, which are: (a) being substrate of inherence; (b) subsisting in/by itself, that is, existing in/by itself and not in/by another; (c) having a complete nature, that is, directly fitting in a genus and in a species and having all the necessary to accomplish its natural operations. In other words, the primary sense of *substance* and *hoc aliquid* concerns an individual to which/whom one can ostensibly point.<sup>13</sup>

Thereafter, Aquinas investigates which are the different meanings that the terms *substance* and *hoc aliquid* have when they are referred to matter, to the substantial form and to the compound. *Matter* is *substance* and *hoc aliquid* because (a) it is a subject with which the substantial form unites and in which the modifications between contraries happen; (b) it does not subsist in itself, since it cannot exist separated from the substantial form, neither in a conceptual manner, nor in a real manner; (c) in primary sense, it

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<sup>12</sup> S. THOMAE DE AQUINO, 1964, *In Metaphys.*, VII, lect. 2, n. 1276, p. 321: "Dicit ergo primo, quod subiectum, quod est prima substantia particularis, in tria dividitur; scilicet in materiam, et formam, et compositum ex eis. Quae quidem divisio non est generis in species, sed alicuius analogice praedicati, quod de eis, quae sub eo continentur, per prius et posterius praedicatur. Tam enim compositum quam materia et forma particularis substantia dicitur, sed non eodem ordine; et ideo posterius inquireret quid horum per prius sit substantia."

<sup>13</sup> S. THOMAE DE AQUINO, 1964, *In Metaphys.*, V, lect. 10, n. 903, p. 242: "Deinde cum dicit 'accidit itaque' Reducit dictos modos substantiae ad duos; dicens, quod ex praedictis modis considerari potest, quod substantia duobus modis dicitur: quorum unus est secundum quod substantia dicitur id quod ultimo subiicitur in propositionibus, ita quod de alio non praedicatur, sicut substantia prima. Et hoc est, quod est hoc aliquid, quasi per se subsistens, et quod est separabile, quia est ab omnibus distinctum et non communicabile multis." *Id.*, 1984, vol., XLV.1, *In De Anima*, II, lect. 1, l. 102-105, p. 69: "[S]ubstantia vero composita est quae est hoc aliquid. Dicitur enim esse hoc aliquid aliquid demonstratum quod est completum in esse et specie, et hoc competit soli substantie compositae in rebus materialibus." *Id.*, 1968, *Q. de Anima*, q. 1, co., p. 57: "Dicendum quod hoc aliquid proprie dicitur individuum in genere substantiae. Dicit enim Philosophus in *Praedicamentis*, quod primae substantiae indubitanter hoc aliquid significant; secundae vero substantiae, etsi videantur hoc aliquid significare, magis tamen significant quale quid. Individuum autem in genere substantiae non solum habet quod per se possit subsistere, sed quod sit aliquid completum in aliqua specie et genere substantiae."

is *substance* and *hoc aliquid* in potency. Thus, matter has the *improper sense* of *substance* and *hoc aliquid*.<sup>14</sup> The *compound*, in its turn, is *substance* and *hoc aliquid* because (a) it is the last substrate of predication and inherence; (b) it subsists in itself, since it exists separated from other compounds in a real manner; (c) it has a complete nature. Thus, it is *substance* and *hoc aliquid* in *primary sense*.<sup>15</sup> Lastly, the *substantial form* is *substance* and *hoc aliquid* because (a) it is that through which matter is actualized and becomes a compound; (b) it does not subsist by itself, since it exists separated from matter in the conceptual manner, but not in real manner; (c) it is the principle through which the generical and specific determinations are received; (d) it is the principle through which something undertakes the primary sense of *substance* and *hoc aliquid*. Therefore, it is *substance* and *hoc aliquid* in *secondary sense*.<sup>16</sup>

So far, we see that there is nothing more than a compatibilistic reading of Aristotle here. The novelty will concern the evaluation of the meaning of *substance* and of *hoc aliquid* proper to the human soul. As seen, the primary sense gathers three attributes: *being substrate of inherence*, *being subsistent in itself*, and *having a complete nature*. Only the compounds possess the three. The human soul, in turn, must be classified as *substance* and as *hoc aliquid* secondarily because it is the formal principle through which a potentially alive body becomes a living being, that is, a compound.<sup>17</sup> Nonetheless, Aquinas agrees that it has certain attributes of the primary sense. Let us move to the exam of each of these attributes, which will allow us to show not only in which sense the human soul is *substance* and *hoc aliquid*, but also that subsisting in itself is a property that can be granted, in Aquinas, to the compounds and to some of their parts.<sup>18</sup>

<sup>14</sup>S. THOMAE DE AQUINO, 1964, *In Metaphys.*, VII, lect. 2, n. 1289, p. 323: “Non est ergo intelligendum, quod substantia actu existens (de qua hic loquimur) de materia praedicetur praedicatione univoca, sive quae est per essentiam. Iam enim supra dixerat, quod materia non est quid, neque aliquid aliorum. Sed intelligendum est de denominativa praedicatione, per quem modum accidentia de substantia praedicantur.” *Ibid.*, *In Metaphys.*, VIII, lect. 1, n. 1687, p. 403: “Materia enim dicitur substantia non quasi ens aliquid actu existens in se considerata, sed quasi in potentia, ut sit aliquid actu, haec dicitur esse hoc aliquid.” *Ibid.*, *In Metaphys.*, VIII, lect. 1, n. 1688, p. 404: “Secundo ibi, ‘quia vero’. Dicit, quod necesse est in substantiis sensibilibus ponere materiam quasi substantiam et subiectum. In omni enim mutatione oportet esse subiectum commune terminis mutationis in contrariis mutationibus.” *Id.*, 1984, vol. XLV.1, *In De Anima*, II, lect. 1, l. 98-100, p. 69: “Materia quidem est quae secundum se non est hoc aliquid, sed in potentia tantum ut sit hoc aliquid.”

<sup>15</sup>S. THOMAE DE AQUINO, 1964, *In Metaphys.*, VII, lect. 2, n. 1293, p. 323: “compositum et est separabile, et est hoc aliquid.” *Ibid.*, *In Metaphys.*, VIII, lect. 1, n. 1687, p. 404: “Compositum vero ex his dicitur esse substantia quasi ‘separabile simpliciter’, idest separatim per se existere potens in rerum natura; et eius solius est generatio et corruptio. Neque enim forma neque materia generatur aut corrumpitur nisi per accidens.” *Id.*, 1984, vol. XLV.1, *In De Anima*, II, lect. 1, l. 102-105 p. 69: “[S]ubstantia vero composita est quae est hoc aliquid. Dicitur enim esse hoc aliquid demonstratum quod est completum in esse et specie, et hoc competit soli substantie compositae in rebus materialibus.”

<sup>16</sup>S. THOMAE DE AQUINO, 1964, *In Metaphys.*, V, lect. 10, n. 904, p. 242: “Sed etiam forma et species uniuscuiusque rei, ‘dicitur tale’, idest substantia. In quo includit et secundum et quartum modum. Essentia enim et forma in hoc conveniunt quod secundum utrumque dicitur esse illud quo aliquid est. Sed forma refertur ad materiam, quam facit esse in actu; quidditas autem refertur ad suppositum, quod significatur ut habens talem essentiam.” *Ibid.*, *In Metaphys.*, VII, lect. 2, n. 1293, p. 323: “Forma autem, etsi non sit separabilis, et hoc aliquid, tamen per ipsam compositum fit ens actu, ut sic possit esse separabile, et hoc aliquid.” *Ibid.*, *In Metaphys.*, VII, lect. 17, n. 1668, p. 397: “Quare manifestum est quod in talibus quaestionibus quaeritur ‘causa materiae’, idest propter quid materia pertingat ad naturam eius quod definitur. Hoc autem quaesitum quod est causa materiae ‘est species’, scilicet forma qua aliquid est. Hoc autem ‘est substantia’, idest ipsa substantia quae est quod quid erat esse. Et sic relinquatur quod propositum erat ostendere, scilicet quod substantia sit principium et causa.” *Ibid.*, *In Metaphys.*, VIII, lect. 1, n. 1687, p. 403-404: “Forma vero, quae et ratio nominatur, quia ex ipsa sumitur ratio speciei, dicitur substantia quasi ens aliquid actu, et quasi ens separabile secundum rationem a materia, licet non secundum rem.” *Id.*, 1984, vol. XLV.1, *In De Anima*, II, lect. 1, l. 100-101, p. 69: “Forma autem est, secundum quam iam est hoc aliquid in actu.” It is worth mentioning that Aristotle understands the form as universal. Aquinas accepts it in his commentaries to Aristotle, but rejects it in his own works, understanding the form as singular.

<sup>17</sup>S. THOMAE DE AQUINO, 1984, vol. XLV.1, *In De Anima*, II, lect. 1, l. 221-223, p. 70: “quod anima sit substantia sicut forma vel species talis corporis, scilicet corporis phisici habentis in potentia vitam.”

<sup>18</sup>In the description of the attributes of the primary sense of *substance* and of *hoc aliquid*, we adapted an argument we presented in detail in the article *A Subsistência Por Si da Alma Humana e das Partes Corpóreas em Tomás de Aquino* (*The Subsistence in Itself of the Human Soul and of the Corporal Parts in Thomas Aquinas*), published in *Analytica*, v. 23, n. 2, 2019, p. 57-87.





The first attribute of the primary sense is being *substrate of inherence*. According to Aquinas, the human soul, because it is a substantial form, must actualize the body as a whole and each of its parts (see THOMAS AQUINAS, 2015, *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 76, art. 8, p. 398-401 [S. Thomae de Aquino, 1889, vol. V, p. 232-233]; *Id.*, 2012, *Q. de Anima*, q. 10, p. 209-227 [S. Thomae de Aquino, 1968, p. 155-165]). Thus, it will arrange each of the parts of the body, granting them specific human capacities (or faculties). For example, it will organize a specific body part, like the eyes, granting them the faculty of vision; it will organize another part of the body, like the tongue, granting it the faculty of taste and so on.

Nonetheless, the intellect would be an exception. In fact, this would be a faculty whose instantiation would not take place in a corporal part for three reasons (see THOMAS AQUINAS, 2009-2014, *In Sent.*, II, d. 19, q. 1, art. 1 [S. Thomae de Aquino, 1929, vol. II, p. 481-482]; *Id.*, 2015, *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 75, art. 2, p. 358-359 [S. Thomae de Aquino, 1889, vol. V, p. 196]; *Ibid.*, *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 75, art. 5, p. 364-365 [S. Thomae de Aquino, 1889, vol V, p. 202]; *Id.*, 1996, *In De Causis*, lect. 7, p. 53-59 [S. Thomae de Aquino, 1954, p. 48-54]; *Ibid.*, *In De Causis*, lect. 15, p. 99-102 [S. Thomae de Aquino, 1954, p. 88-92]): (a) *the cognitive extension of the intellect*: the intellect is capable of reaching the knowledge of all corporal natures, which would be impossible if it was a faculty instantiated by corporal organs, which is restricted to the knowledge of a determined set of things (for example, the vision, a faculty instantiated by the eyes, can only apprehend colors, being incapable of apprehending sounds). Thus, the intellect is not a faculty instantiated by corporal organs; (b) *the object known by the intellect*: the intellect is capable of knowing the universal aspects of things, which would be impossible if it was a faculty instantiated by corporal organs, which is restricted to the knowledge of accidental aspects of things (for example, the vision, a faculty instantiated by the eyes, apprehends the color of something, but not the nature of the color). Thus, the intellect is not a faculty instantiated by corporal organs; (c) *the capacity of reflection of the intellect*: the intellect is capable of being aware of the intellectual act and of knowing its own nature, which would be impossible if it was a faculty instantiated by corporal organs, which is organized to know only the accidental properties of the extramental objects (for example, the vision, faculty instantiated by the eyes, sees the colors of things that exist in the exterior world, but it is incapable of being aware of the activity of seeing and of knowing its own nature). Thus, the intellect is not a faculty instantiated by the corporal organs.<sup>19</sup>

Although the intellectual faculty is not instantiated in any corporal part of the human being, it seems, however, necessary that some part of the human being instantiates it. Now, if the intellect is not instantiated in a corporal part, we must conclude that it must be instantiated in a non-corporal part, that is, in the human soul. Thus, whereas the corporal parts are that which will instantiate the sensitive and vegetative faculties, the human soul is that which will instantiate the intellectual faculty.<sup>20</sup> In short, we can say that the human soul and the corporal parts share the aspect of being instances of determined faculties and operations.

<sup>19</sup> It is not our objective to discuss in detail these three proofs and its problems. For R. Pasnau (1998; 2001) and J. Novak (1987) these proofs are victims of the so-called *content fallacy*, in which the real material or the real immaterial nature of the faculty are inferred from the particular or the universal intentional contents it receives. In fact, the senses are faculties instantiated by corporal organs (that is, they have real material nature) because they apprehend the singular sensitive qualities of a thing (that is, because they receive particular intentional contents); the intellect is not instantiated by a corporal organ (that is, it has immaterial real nature) because it apprehends the essence of a thing (that is, because it receives universal intentional contents). The problem in this inference is the fact that it passes from a premise with intentional value (that is, of the particular or universal contents present in a faculty) to a conclusion with real value (that is, for the material or immaterial nature of the faculty) without an intermediary premise that justifies this passage. For further details on the arguments on the immateriality of the intellect and on the content fallacy, see also KLIMA, 2001a, 2001b; CORY, 2017; O'CALLAGHAN, 2015.

<sup>20</sup> S. THOMAE DE AQUINO, 1889, vol. V, *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 76, art. 1, ad 1, p. 210: "virtus intellectiva non est virtus alicuius organi corporalis, sicut virtus visiva est actus oculi; intelligere enim est actus qui non potest exerceri per organum corporale, sicut exercetur visio."

In other words, we can say that they share the aspect of being *subjects or substrates in/by themselves*<sup>21</sup> of human faculties and operations.

Well, our line of thought understands that the corporal parts are the subjects or substrates in themselves of the vegetative and sensitive faculties and that the human soul is the subject or substrate in itself of the intellectual activity. However, Aquinas also sees the compounds as subjects or substrates in themselves of the vegetative, sensitive, and intellectual faculties (see THOMAS AQUINAS, 2015, *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 75, art. 2, ad 2, p. 359-360 [S. Thomae de Aquino, 1889, vol. V, p. 196-197]; *Ibid.*, *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 77, art. 5, p. 412-413 [S. Thomae de Aquino, 1889, vol. V, p. 244-245]). How can this difficulty be solved? In order to combine these two positions and solve this problem, we must claim that Aquinas distinguishes between two kinds of substrates or subjects in/by themselves:<sup>22</sup> (a) *subjects or substrates by themselves, at an immediate level, of faculties and operations* (the corporal parts and the human soul); (b) *subjects or substrates by themselves, at a proper level, of faculties and operations* (the compounds).<sup>23</sup> Therefore, in the first place, the compounds are the subjects or substrates by themselves, at a proper level, of the sensitive, vegetative, and intellectual faculties and operations; secondly, the corporal parts are the subjects or substrates by themselves, at an immediate level, of the sensitive and vegetative faculties and operations; and, thirdly, the human soul is the subject or the substrate by itself, at an immediate level, of the intellectual faculty and operations, having, then, the first attribute of the primary sense of *substance* and of *hoc aliquid*.

The second attribute of the primary sense is the subsistence by itself. There is a famous axiom of the Thomistic philosophy according to which *each thing acts insofar as it exists in act*,<sup>24</sup> that is, something is subject or substrate by itself of faculties and operations insofar as it receives the act of being or existence through the form. In short, it means that *something is subject insofar as it is the subject in itself, or the receptacle*,

<sup>21</sup> We add the qualifier *in/by itself* to *subject* or *substrate* because Aquinas understands the accident of quantity as the *subject* or *substrate* of the other accidents, but not as their subject or substrate *in/by itself*, once only that which exists in/by itself (that is, subsists in/by itself) can be subject or substrate in/by itself of something (see THOMAS AQUINAS, 2015, *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 78, art. 3, ad 2, p. 428 [S. Thomae de Aquino, 1889, vol. V, p. 254]; *Id.*, 2013, *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 77, art. 2, ad 1, p. 313 [S. Thomae de Aquino, 1906, p. 197]). Once, as we will see later on, Aquinas states that the human soul and the corporal parts are subsistent in/by themselves, then we must understand them as subjects and substrates in/by themselves of human faculties and operations.

<sup>22</sup> Aquinas seems to defend something similar in: S. THOMAE DE AQUINO, 1889, vol. V, *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 75, art. 2, ad 2, p. 196-197: “Vel dicendum quod per se agere convenit per se existenti. Sed per se existens quandoque potest dici aliquid si non sit inhaerens ut accidens vel ut forma materialis, etiam si sit pars. Sed proprie et per se subsistens dicitur quod neque est praedictio modo inhaerens, neque est pars. Secundum quem modum oculus aut manus non posset dici per se subsistens; et per consequens nec per se operans. Unde et operationes partium attribuantur toti per partes. Dicimus enim quod homo videt per oculum, et palpat per manum, aliter quam calidum calefacit per calorem, quia calor nullo modo calefacit, proprie loquendo. Potest igitur dici quod anima intelligit, sicut oculus videt, sed magis proprie dicitur quod homo intelligat per animam.” *Ibid.*, *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 76, art. 1, p. 209: “Attribuitur autem aliqua actio alicui tripliciter, ut patet per philosophum, V Physic., dicitur enim movere aliquid aut agere vel secundum se totum, sicut medicus sanat; aut secundum partem, sicut homo videt per oculum; aut per accidens, sicut dicitur quod album aedificat, quia accidit aedificatori esse album.”

<sup>23</sup> We make use of this nomenclature because the human soul and the corporal parts, although they are, indeed, the subjects in themselves of human faculties and operations, they are also part of a compound. Thus, the compound they integrate will be, properly speaking, the subject in itself of these faculties and operations.

<sup>24</sup> Another version of this axiom is: *the act follows the mode of being (agere sequitur esse)*. It appears, for example, in: THOMAS AQUINAS, 1952, *De Pot.*, q. 3, art. 9 [S. Thomae de Aquino, 1953b, §58863]; *Ibid.*, *De Pot.*, q. 3, art. 11 [S. Thomae de Aquino, 1953b, §58954]; *Id.*, 2015, *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 50, art. 5, p. 125 [S. Thomae de Aquino, 1889, vol. V, p. 12]; *Ibid.*, *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 75, art. 2, p. 359 [S. Thomae de Aquino, 1889, vol. V, p. 196]; *Ibid.*, *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 75, art. 3, p. 361 [S. Thomae de Aquino, 1889, vol. V, p. 200]; *Id.*, 2012, *Q. de Anima*, q. 1, p. 43 [S. Thomae de Aquino, 1968, p. 58]. For further details, see FISHER, 2017, pp. 93-105. According to K. Fisher, such axiom is used in other moments: (a) to show that only God creates; (b) to show that creatures act according to a purpose; (c) to show that the soul is the substantial form of the body; (d) to show that all things produce something similar to themselves; (e) to show that there is no *per se* cause of evil. It seems that there is no explicit relation between this axiom and the axiom *everything that is received is received according to the mode of the receptacle* (FISHER, 2017, p. 95). For further details on this other axiom, see WIPPEL, 2007, p. 113.

of the act of being.<sup>25</sup> Now, substantial forms distinct from the human soul are principles that grant the body and its parts certain faculties and operations, but they are not subjects in themselves of these faculties and operations. If there is a correspondence between *being subject in itself of faculties and operations* and *being receptacle of the act of being*, then we can affirm that these forms are not receptacles of the act of being, but principles that grant the body and its parts this act. The corporal parts and the human soul, in turn, are subjects in themselves of faculties and operations. If there is a correspondence between *being subject in itself of faculties and operations* and *being receptacle of the act of being*, then we can affirm that the corporal parts and the human soul are receptacles of the act of being.

On the one hand, Aquinas states that the human soul is the substantial form responsible not only for organizing the body and its parts, but also for granting the body and its parts the act of being. In other words, it is that through which the body and its parts exist (see THOMAS AQUINAS, 1990, *Cont. Gent.*, II, c. 43, §1196, p. 236-237 [S. Thomae de Aquino, 1918, vol. XIII, p. 367]; *Ibid.*, *Cont. Gent.*, II, c. 54, §1290-1292, p. 256 [S. Thomae de Aquino, 1918, vol. XIII, p. 392]; *Id.*, 2012, *Q. de Anima*, q. 10, ad 16, p. 225 [S. Thomae de Aquino, 1968, p. 164]).<sup>26</sup> On the other hand, Aquinas understands that the corporal parts are body portions that not only are organized by the substantial forms, but also receive from them the act of being. In other words, it is that which exists thanks to the being granted by the human soul.<sup>27</sup> From these two points, we can infer two things: firstly, that the corporal parts are subjects in themselves of the act of being communicated by the substantial form, that is, they are *receptacles of the act of being*; secondly, that the soul is subject in itself of the act of being and principle through which this act is granted to the body and its parts, that is, it is *receptacle* and *diffuser of the act of being*.

Well, Aquinas in certain moments identifies the subsistence in itself of the human soul with the *attribute of having the being*, that is, with the *attribute of being receptacle of the act of being*.<sup>28</sup> In addition, he seems to classify, in two texts, the human soul and the corporal parts as unequivocally subsistent in themselves. Let us check the two texts in which this classification is presented.

The first text has been already quoted in the beginning of our article, that is, THOMAS AQUINAS, 2015, *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 75, art. 2, ad 1, p. 359 [S. Thomae de Aquino, 1889, vol., V, p. 196]. In it, Aquinas states that there are two kinds of items that are subsistent in themselves, namely, the specifically complete ones and the specifically incomplete ones. The compounds are included in the first group, whereas the human soul and the body parts are included in the second group. With regard to the latter, Aquinas does not seem to present a semantic difference between the subsistence in itself of the human soul and the subsistence in itself of the corporal parts. In fact, whereas the compounds are distinct from the soul and the corporal

<sup>25</sup> S. THOMAE DE AQUINO, 1953a, *De spirit. creat.*, a. 2, §64006: “Nulla autem operatio convenit alicui nisi per aliquam formam in ipso existentem, vel substantialem vel accidentalem; quia nihil agit aut operatur nisi secundum quod est actu. Est autem unumquodque actu per formam aliquam vel substantialem vel accidentalem, cum forma sit actus; sicut ignis est actu ignis per igneitatē, actu calidus per calorem. Oportet igitur principium huius operationis quod est intelligere, formaliter inesse huic homini.” *Id.*, 1888, vol. IV, *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 42, art. 1, ad 1, p. 436: “Primus autem effectus formae est esse, nam omnis res habet esse secundum suam formam. Secundus autem effectus est operatio, nam omne agens agit per suam formam.”

<sup>26</sup> For further details on the relation between the substantial form and the act of being, see BØGESKOV, 2013; GEACH, 2006.

<sup>27</sup> Aquinas presents a thorough investigation of the corporal parts and the parts of the compound in, for example, THOMAS AQUINAS, 1961, *In Metaphys.*, VII, lect. 9, §1460-1481 [S. Thomae de Aquino, 1964, p. 357-360] and lect. 10, §1482-1500 [S. Thomae de Aquino, 1964, p. 362-364].

<sup>28</sup> S. THOMAE DE AQUINO, 1953b, *De Pot.*, q. 3, art. 9, §58863: “quia rationalis anima in hoc a ceteris formis differt, quod aliis formis non competit esse in quo ipsae subsistant, sed quo eis res formatae subsistant; anima vero rationalis sic habet esse ut in eo subsistens; et hoc declarat diversus modus agendi.” *Id.*, 1968, *Q. de Anima*, q. 1, p. 58: “Et quia unumquodque agit secundum quod est actu, oportet quod anima intellectiva habeat esse per se absolutum non dependens a corpore. Formae enim quae habent esse dependens a materia vel subiecto, non habent per se operationem: non enim calor agit, sed calidus.” See also THOMAS AQUINAS, 1996, *Cont. Gent.*, IV, 49, §3840, p. 812 [S. Thomae de Aquino, 1930, vol., XV, p. 156].

parts because the former are complete in species and the latter are incomplete in species, the human soul and the corporal parts do not seem distinguished according to different senses of *subsistence in itself*.

The second text is THOMAS AQUINAS, 2012, *Q. de Anima*, q. 1, p. 40-45 [S. Thomae de Aquino, 1968, p. 57-59]. Here, Aquinas initially states that the term *hoc aliquid* refers above all else to the individuals or compounds (that is, to the first substances), rather than to the genus and the species of the compounds (that is, the second substances). Like in the previous text, he then presents two kinds of items that are subsistent in themselves: (a) the ones complete in genus and species; (b) the ones incomplete in genus and species. At a certain moment of his answer, he adds both the human soul and the corporal parts to (b) kind. Again, we notice that Aquinas denominates, indifferently, the human soul and the corporal parts as subsistent in themselves, since this text distinguishes the compounds from the human soul and from the corporal parts through the respective presence and absence of completeness in genus and species, but it does not distinguish the human soul from the corporal parts through distinct meanings of *subsistence in itself*.<sup>29</sup>

Thus, once Aquinas understands the human soul and the corporal parts as unequivocally subsistent in themselves in the texts mentioned above and defines the subsistence in itself of the human soul as the *attribute of being receptacle of the act of being*, then two conclusions must follow: firstly, that the corporal parts are subsistent in themselves because they are the receptacles of the act of being communicated by the substantial form; secondly, that the human soul is subsistent in itself and diffusive principle of the act of being to the body and its parts because it is not only the receptacle of the act of being, but also the substantial form responsible for communicating the act of which it is receptacle to the body and its parts.

According to this reading, we claim that both the compounds and some of its parts (that is, the soul and the corporal parts) are items to which the subsistence in itself can be assigned. In the first place, the compounds are classified as subsistent in themselves because they are receptacles of the act of being granted by the substantial form that is part of them. We have seen that the substantial forms are responsible for granting existence to the body and its parts. That means that they are the principles that grant existence to the compounds as such, that is, they are that through which the latter exist (see THOMAS AQUINAS, 1990, *Cont. Gent.*, II, c. 43, §1196, p. 236-237 [S. Thomae de Aquino, 1918, vol. XIII, p. 367]). Since, on the one hand, the compounds are the *subjects in themselves, at a proper level, of the vegetative, sensitive, and intellectual faculties* and since, on the other hand, there is a correspondence between *being subject in itself of faculties and operations* and *being receptacle of the act of being*, then the compounds are the *receptacles, at a proper level, of the act of being*. The corporal parts, in turn, are classified as subsistent in themselves because they are receptacles of an act of being granted by the substantial form that actualizes the compound. Since, on the one hand, they are the *subjects in themselves, at an immediate level, of the vegetative and sensitive faculties* and since, on the other hand, there is a correspondence between *being subject in itself of faculties and operations* and *being receptacle of the act of being*, then the corporal parts are the *receptacles, at an immediate level, of the act of being*. Finally, the human soul is also classified as subsistent in itself because it is the receptacle of the act of being. Since, on the one hand, it is the *subject in itself, at an immediate level,*

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<sup>29</sup> It is important to emphasize that this text defines subsistence in itself as the *property of not existing in another as in its subject*, which perhaps does not fit our definition of subsistence in itself as the *property of being receptacle of the act of being*. Nonetheless, these two definitions seem compatible. On the one hand, that which is not subsistent in itself *exists in another as in its subject* because it is united with a determinate subject as the *diffusive principle of the act of being* to this subject (for example, the vegetative soul actualizes the body and its parts by organizing them and granting them the act of being and by turning them into subjects in themselves of determinate faculties and operations). On the other hand, that which is subsistent in itself *does not exist in another as in its subject* because it is the very subject in itself of the act of being, that is, it is the very *receptacle of that act* (for example, the corporal parts are gathered by the substantial form, they receive from the latter the act of being and become, through the form, the subject in themselves of determinate faculties and operations). Therefore, whereas the soul and the corporal parts *do not exist in another as in their subject* due to the fact that they are *receptacles of the act of being* the substantial forms distinct from the human soul and the accidental forms *exist in another as in their subject* due to the fact that they are *not receptacles of the act of being*.



of the intellectual faculty and since, on the other, there is a correspondence between *being subject in itself of faculties and operations* and *being receptacle of the act of being*, then the soul will be the receptacle, at an immediate level, of the act of being.<sup>30</sup>

Nonetheless, it is worth mentioning that the act of being of which the human soul is receptacle cannot come from another substantial form (see THOMAS AQUINAS, 2015, *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 75, art. 5, ad 3, p. 366 [S. Thomae de Aquino, 1889, vol. V, p. 202]). This is impossible for two reasons. At first glance, because one would have to admit the presence of two substantial forms in the compound (that is, the soul itself and the form that grants its act of being), going against the Thomistic doctrine on the unicity of the form (see THOMAS AQUINAS, 2015, *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 76, art. 3, p. 383-387 [S. Thomae de Aquino, 1889, vol. V, p. 220-221]; *Ibid.*, *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 76, art. 4, p. 387-391 [S. Thomae de Aquino, 1889, vol. V, p. 223-224]).<sup>31</sup> Secondly, because one would have to defend the actualization of the substantial form through another substantial form, which would contradict the Thomistic philosophy not only for attributing a hylomorphic composition to something that, in turn, is constitutive element of this composition, but also for granting to the substantial form the ontological condition of a compound and for considering as accidental or immediate its union with the body (see THOMAS AQUINAS, 2012, *Q. de Anima*, q. 6, *sed contra*, p. 129 [S. Thomae de Aquino, 1968, p. 109]; *Ibid.*, *Q. de Anima*, q. 6, p. 131/p. 133 [S. Thomae de Aquino, 1968, p. 110/p. 111]; *Id.*, 2009-2014, *In Sent.*, II, d. 17, q. 1, a. 2, *sed contra* [S. Thomae de Aquino, 1929, vol. II, p. 417]).<sup>32</sup> In the light of this reasoning, we conclude that the soul has the second attribute of the primary sense of *substance* and of *hoc aliquid*.<sup>33</sup>

Lastly, let us move to the third attribute of the primary sense of *substance* and of *hoc aliquid*, that is, the *complete nature*. According to Aquinas, the attribute of *complete nature* comprises two characteristics: (a) *to be directly classified in a genus and in a species*; (b) *to have all the necessary conditions for the accomplishment of its natural operations* (see THOMAS AQUINAS, 1949, *De spirit. creat.*, a. 1, ad 5 [S. Thomae de Aquino, 1953a, §64011]; *Id.*, 2012, *Q. de Anima*, q. 1, ad 12, p. 49 [S. Thomae de Aquino, 1968, p. 62], *Ibid.*, *Q. de Anima*, q. 1, ad 13, p. 51 [S. Thomae de Aquino, 1968, p. 62]; *Ibid.*, *Q. de Anima*, q. 2, ad 10, p. 71 [S. Thomae de Aquino, 1968, p. 74]). Nonetheless, these two characteristics are not met by the soul.

Let us start with the (a) characteristic. On the one hand, the compounds are directly classified in genus and species. Thus, a dog is directly classified in the genus *animal* and in the species *dog*. On the other hand, the corporal parts and the human soul are indirect subjects of the classification in genus and species because they are not only included in a whole (that is, in a compound) that is the direct subject of this classification, but they also are reduced to the genus and the species of the whole of which they are part. Thus, the hand and the soul are indirectly classified as human because they are included in a compound that is directly classified in the genus *animal* and in the species *man* (THOMAS AQUINAS, 2012, *Q.*

<sup>30</sup> We make use of this nomenclature because the soul and the corporal parts, although they are indeed the receptacle of the act of being, are also part of a compound. Thus, the compound they integrate will be, properly speaking, the receptacle of this act.

<sup>31</sup> For further details on the controversy between the doctrines on the unicity and plurality of substantial forms, cf. ZAVALLONI, 1951; WIPPEL, 2011.

<sup>32</sup> This is one of the arguments presented by Aquinas against Avicenna's universal hylomorphism, who attributes to the human soul a compound of form and matter.

<sup>33</sup> An additional question arises: once the act of being of which the human soul is receptacle does not derive from the actualization of a substantial form, then what is the principle responsible for granting it such an act? According to Aquinas, the human soul is the only kind of substantial form created directly by God. Thus, at the moment of the creation of the human being, the progenitors (giving origin to the body) and God (giving origin to the soul) conjoin. Thus, God is the principle responsible for granting the soul the act of being of which it is receptacle (see THOMAS AQUINAS, 1952, *De Pot.*, q. 3, art. 9 [S. Thomae de Aquino, 1953b, §58832-58888]; *Ibid.*, *De Pot.*, q. 3, art. 11 [S. Thomae de Aquino, 1953b, §58932-58974]). For a further discussion on the problems involved in this statement from Aquinas, see BAZÁN, 2011.



*de Anima*, q. 1, ad 13, p. 51 [S. Thomae de Aquino, 1968, p. 62]). Furthermore, in the case of the human soul, we must say that it is the indirect subject of this classification for two other reasons: in the first place, because it is the principle through which the compound becomes the direct subject of the classification in genus and species, that is, it is the principle through which a compound is directly classified in the genus *animal* and in the species *man* (THOMAS AQUINAS, 2012, *Q. de Anima*, q. 7, ad 15, p. 145 [S. Thomae de Aquino, 1968, p. 126]; *Id.*, 2015, *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 76, art. 1, p. 376 [S. Thomae de Aquino, 1889, vol. V, p. 209]); in the second place, because it is that which, along with the body, constitutes the species *man*, that is, the species *man* is not defined only with regard to the soul, but with regard to the compound of body and soul (THOMAS AQUINAS, 2015, *Summa Theol.* I, q. 75, art. 4, p. 362-363 [S. Thomae de Aquino, 1889, vol. V, p. 200]).<sup>34</sup>

Let us now analyze the (b) characteristic. While the compounds have all the necessary conditions to carry out their operations, the corporal parts do not gather all the necessary conditions to carry out their operations. Indeed, the corporal parts are the subjects in themselves of the sensitive and vegetative faculties. Nonetheless, they cannot carry out the operations that concern them when they are separated from the substantial form that actualizes them and from the compound of which they are part, since the fact of being actualized by the substantial form of the compound in which they are included is the necessary condition for them to carry out these operations. On its turn, the human soul does not have all the necessary conditions to carry out its operations. In fact, it is the principle responsible for granting the sensitive and vegetative faculties and the subject in itself of the intellectual faculty. However, when separated from the body which it actualizes and from the compound of which it is part, the human soul cannot accomplish the sensitive and vegetative faculties, once it demands as necessary condition the instantiation of these faculties by the corporal parts. Moreover, the separated soul cannot accomplish the intellectual faculty. Although it is a faculty instantiated by the soul, its exercise requires as necessary condition the exercise of the sensitive faculties, which, as said, requires the instantiation of these faculties by the corporal parts. Therefore, Aquinas agrees that the exercise of the intellectual faculty by the separated soul is carried out through a special divine assistance that supplies the lack of the senses (see, for instance, TOMAS AQUINAS, 2007-2008, *In Sent.*, IV, d. 44, q. 3, art. 3 [S. Thomae de Aquino, 1858, §21590-21640]; *Id.*, 2012, *Q. de Anima*, q. 19, p. 379-395 [S. Thomae de Aquino, 1968, p. 248-250]; *Id.*, 2015, *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 77, art. 8, p. 417-419 [S. Thomae de Aquino, 1889, vol. V, p. 248-249]).<sup>35</sup> Thus, the exam of these two characteristics enables us to affirm that the human soul does not have the third attribute of the primary sense of *substance* and of *hoc aliquid*.

From our investigation, we can conclude that the human soul meets the *secondary sense of substance* and of *hoc aliquid* (for being a substantial form or principle of the substantiality of the compound) and that it meets two attributes of the *primary sense* (for being subsistent in itself and substrate of inherence of the intellect). Thus, we can say that it is *substance* and *hoc aliquid in a peculiar sense*.

<sup>34</sup>It is worth remembering that to a compound is assigned matter determined by dimensions, that is, the designated matter, and to the definition of a compound is assigned the common matter, that is, the non-designated matter (see THOMAS AQUINAS, 1981, *De ente*, c. 2, p. 65-68 [S. Thomae de Aquino, 1976, vol. XLIII, p. 371]; *Id.*, 1961, *In Metaphys.*, VII, lect. 10, §1491-1492 [S. Thomae de Aquino, 1964, p. 363]). Aquinas will say that the designated matter is responsible for the individuation of the compounds, so that it cannot be included in the definition, once it involves universality. Thus, in the definition of a compound materiality must be mentioned, but without its dimensions. Therefore, by defining any compound it must be said that it is constituted with form and (common) matter, not that it is constituted with *this* form and with *this* matter. In other words, the definition includes matter and form as *parts of the species* (in Latin, *partes speciei*), not as *parts of the individual* (in Latin, *partes individui*). For more details on the definition of the compounds in Aquinas and Aristotle, see MAURER, 1990, p. 13-15.

<sup>35</sup>For more details on the intellection of the separated soul, see PEGIS, 1974; SWEENEY, 1999, p. 142-187; OWENS, 1987, p. 249-270.

In addition, four senses of *substance* and of *hoc aliquid* are presented by means of this overview. The primary sense refers to the compound, which is *an individual that is substrate of properties* (i.e., subject in itself, at a proper level, of faculties and operations), *subsistent in itself* (i.e., receptacle, at a proper level, of the act of being) *and endowed with a complete nature* (i.e., directly framed in genus and species and capable of accomplishing its proper operations). On its turn, the *secondary sense* refers to the substantial form, which is *the principle of substantiality of the compound*. The *improper sense*, in turn, refers to matter, which is *the substrate of the substantial form*. Finally, the *peculiar sense* refers to the human soul, which is *a principle of substantiality that is substrate of properties* (i.e., subject in itself, at an immediate level, of the intellectual faculty and operations) *and subsistent in itself* (i.e., receptacle, at an immediate level, of the act of being).<sup>36</sup>

Such outline also shows that the demarcation line between that which is and that which is not *substance* and *hoc aliquid* in *primary sense* comes from the attribute of *complete nature*. In fact, whereas the complete nature is the necessary and sufficient condition for fulfilling the *primary sense*, the subsistence in itself and the instantiation of properties are not sufficient conditions for fulfilling this meaning. On the one hand, that which is substrate of properties, which is subsistent in itself and endowed with complete nature fulfills the *primary sense* and has the ontological status of a hylomorphic compound. On the other hand, that which is substrate of properties, which is subsistent in itself and deprived of complete nature does not fulfill the *primary sense*, but can fulfill the *peculiar sense* and hence has the ontological *status* of a human soul. Thus, our position is similar to the one defended by M. Lenzi and B. Bazán, who affirm that the complete nature is the determining element of the *primary sense* of *substance* and of *hoc aliquid* (LENZI, 2007; BAZÁN, 1997), and contrasts with the one defended by G. Galluzzo, who states that the subsistence in itself is the determining element of the *primary sense* and understands the human soul as an exception to the general rule (GALLUZZO, 2009, p. 184, especially footnote 83).<sup>37</sup>

Therefore, we notice that the underlying strategy of the Thomistic classification of the human soul as *hoc aliquid* and as *substance* is based on the semantic abundance that these words have in Aristotle. By extending this semantic field, Aquinas defends four possible meanings, one of them linked to the compound (that is, the *primary sense*), two of them to the substantial form and to matter of the compound (that is, the *secondary* and *improper senses*, respectively), and one of them linked to the human soul, the substantial form of the human being that combines elements from the *primary* and *secondary senses* (that is, the *peculiar sense*). Thus, *pace* Abel, we understand that: (a) classifying a part of the compound as *substance* and as *hoc aliquid* is not problematic; (b) Aquinas does not subvert the original sense of *substance* and of *hoc aliquid*, but expands it in order to encompass the human soul; (c) Aquinas does not contradict the manner in which he understands the Aristotelian doctrine of substance when he classifies the human soul as *substance* and as *hoc aliquid*.

<sup>36</sup> Aquinas seems to assign the same sense of *substance* and of *hoc aliquid* to the human soul when he compares the human soul with the angelical substances (see THOMAS AQUINAS, 1949, *De spirit. creat.*, a. 2, ad 16 [S. Thomae de Aquino, 1953a, §64069]).

<sup>37</sup> It is important to emphasize that is not the objective of our article to determine what sense of *substance* and of *hoc aliquid* would be fulfilled by the corporal parts, but to compare the human soul and the corporal parts in order to clarify which attributes of the *primary sense* of *substance* and of *hoc aliquid* are fulfilled by the human soul and, thus, to determine the sense of *substance* and of *hoc aliquid* that can be attributed to it. However, once the corporal parts have two among the attributes of the *primary sense* of *substance* and of *hoc aliquid*, but are not principles of substantiality of the compound, we can propose the following classification. There must be an *incomplete sense* of *substance* and of *hoc aliquid* assigned to those items that are substrates of inherence, subsistent in themselves and deprived of complete nature, namely, the human soul and the corporal parts. Nonetheless, there must be a subset pertaining the incomplete sense in which would be included only those items that, besides being substrates of inherence, subsistent in themselves and deprived of complete nature, would be also principles of substantiality. This subset should be the *peculiar sense* of *substance* and of *hoc aliquid*, whose only member is the human soul. Using an analogy, the *incomplete sense* would be, on the one hand, as a genus in which the human soul and the corporal parts would be included, and the peculiar sense, on the other hand, would be as a species in this genus in which only the human soul would be included.

#### 4. Conclusion

The objective of this article was to unravel the underlying strategy of the classification of the human soul as *substance* and as *hoc aliquid* used by Aquinas. One of the problems derived from this nomenclature, as Abel states, is that the hylomorphic compounds are usually so called, not the parts from which they are constituted.

We have shown that even in Aristotle these two terms have three possible meanings and referents: when they refer to *matter*, they mean *that which is substrate of to the substantial form*; when they refer to the *substantial form*, they mean *that which is principle of substantiality of the compound*; when they refer to the *compound*, they mean *that which is an individual endowed with autonomy and specific determination*. However, Aristotle does not specify whether the main meaning of these terms would be related to the compound (compatibilistic approach) or to the substantial form (incompatibilistic approach).

That being said, we have seen that Thomas Aquinas, according to a compatibilistic bias, assumes these three meanings and referents for *substance* and for *hoc aliquid* by making the necessary changes in order to introduce the human soul in this scheme. We have explained that, for Aquinas, the main meaning of *substance* and of *hoc aliquid* has three attributes: (a) being substrate of inherence; (b) being subsistent in itself; (c) having complete nature. The *compound* fulfills the three attributes and, thus, is *substance* and *hoc aliquid* in *primary sense*. *Matter* is the substrate to the substantial form and, thus, is *substance* and *hoc aliquid* in *improper sense*. The *substantial form* is the principle of substantiality of the compound and, therefore, is *substance* and *hoc aliquid* in *secondary sense*. Lastly, the human soul is an intriguing case in this scheme because it fulfills the *secondary sense* (for being principle of substantiality of the compound), and also partially fulfills the *primary sense* (for it is substrate of inherence of the intellectual faculty and is subsistent in itself). Consequently, according to our reading, the human soul is *substance* and *hoc aliquid* in *peculiar sense*.

Finally, we have noticed that the Thomistic classification of the human soul as *substance* and as *hoc aliquid* is based on the semantic abundance that these words have in Aristotle. Expanding this semantic field, Aquinas defends four possible meanings for these terms: one of the senses refers to the compound (that is, the *primary sense*), two refer to the substantial form and to matter (that is, the *secondary* and *improper senses*, respectively) and one to the human soul, the substantial form of the human being, that combines elements of the *primary* and *secondary senses* (that is, the *peculiar sense*).

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